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Abstract
The objective of the thesis is to estimate the degree of cross–border conta-
gion among the Nordic banking sectors. It analyzes a sample of sixteen largest
listed Nordic banks from January 2004 to January 2014. Using a multinomial
logit model we test whether there is any degree of contagion among the four
banking sectors, whether it is more pronounced for larger banks and whether
the recent financial crisis has exacerbated it. Our results are in line with similar
studies conducted for other countries. In particular, we find that a shock in one
banking sector is positively associated with an increase in shocks in another
banking sector. Second, these shocks are larger and more significant for larger
and more active international banks. Finally, the effect of the recent financial
crisis has ambiguous effects on the cross–sectoral banking contagion. It appears
that contagious links between some sectors weakened (Sweden and Denmark,
Sweden and Finland). Other economies (Sweden and Norway) on the contrary
became more dependent on each other. The results are robust to a wide variety
of changes in specifications.
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Proposed topic Cross−Border Contagion in the Banking Sector: The
Case of Nordic Countries
Topic characteristics International financial markets have become signifi-
cantly interconnected over the last two decades. Together with a number of ad-
vantages it has brought some negative effects as well. It has made it simpler to
globally transmit economic shocks: financial event occurring in one part of the
world does not take long to spread and influence the healthy economies around
the world through international stock markets, trading of countless financial
instruments or foreign bank loans. This process is known as cross−border
contagion.
At the beginning of 1990s the Scandinavian countries experienced the bank-
ing crisis. It was a wake up call to implement better policies in banks together
with new fiscal policies. As a result, today the Nordic countries have best rat-
ings from the main credit rating agencies and are considered to be safe havens
in financial markets. Banking sectors in Nordic countries are notably similar in
the structural aspects. It constitutes a significant part of countries economies,
although the relative size varies somewhat. Since 2001 the total assets from
banking sector has increased significantly in every Nordic country. Moreover,
each banking sector is dominated by few large banking groups. The Nordic
countries are also highly integrated. Majority of foreign banks come from an-
other Nordic country and banks from non−Nordic countries take only a small
percentage of the market. According to official statistics, foreign branches con-
stitute to a substantial part of the market in Norway, Sweden, Finland and
Denmark. In Denmark the foreign banks take up to 30% of the market share,
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in Finland it reaches almost 60%, in Norway around 20% and in Sweden it con-
stitutes only around 10% of market share (National Bank of Denmark, 2012).
So despite the similarities, some banking sectors in the Nordic region are
more foreign–owned than the others. This raises a question whether the coun-
tries that have higher market share of foreign banks are more fragile to shocks
than the ones that have banking sector dominated mainly by domestic banks.
To answer this question, I will estimate the extent of cross-border contagion
in the Nordic banking sector which will help us to understand the extent to
which Nordic banking systems became interconnected and how problems could
spread from one country to another.
I will mainly use NASDAQ OMX Nordic databases for stock prices of listed
banks, Bankscope for banking statistics and other various databases such as
Eurostat and OECD for country specific data.
Hypotheses
1. Hypothesis # 1: Cross–border contagion is present and statistically sig-
nificant in the Nordic countries: collapse of banks in one Nordic country
would have negative effect on banking sector in another Nordic country.
2. Hypothesis # 2: Recent financial crisis have intensified the cross–border
contagion which resulted in increased number of linkages across Nordic
countries.
3. Hypothesis # 3: Banking sectors with high share of large internationally
active banks have higher exposure to cross–border contagion.
Methodology There is an extensive research done on the cross− border con-
tagion risk for some of the regions like the Central and Eastern Europe by
Jokipii & Lucey (2007). To contribute to the existing literature I will analyse
the situation specifically in the Nordic countries in order to extent the research.
To test the hypotheses I will methodologically follow other literature.
I will adopt extreme value theory to analyze contagion risk as proposed by
Bae et al. (2003). Moreover, I will follow methodology proposed by Gropp et al.
(2007) who claimed that contagion is related with extreme negative movements
in bank’s default risk and can be predicted using distance to default measure.
The distance to default can be seen as the number of standard deviations away
from the default point at which book value of liabilities are just equal to market
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value of assets. The DD incorporates the information about stock returns with
market leverage and asset volatility that are the main determinants of default
risk. The higher the distance to default, the lower the probability of default
of the bank and vice versa. The advantage of using this approach is that one
does not need to specify a particular channel of contagion, such as cross−border
lending; rather it reflects interdependencies between banking sectors combining
all possible channels of contagion.
The second step is to use a multinomial logit model to estimate the proba-
bility of number of banks in domestic country that experience large shocks on
the same day (“coexceedances”) as banks in foreign countries, after extracting
country specific and global shocks that affect all banks simultaneously. Spe-
cific and common global shocks will be presented by four variables: systemic
risk, stock market volatility in domestic and foreign countries, and interest rate
shocks. I will employ GARCH process to estimate market volatilities. Changes
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International financial markets have become significantly interconnected
over the last two decades. Together with a number of advantages it has brought
some negative effects as well. It has made it simpler to globally transmit eco-
nomic shocks. A financial event occurring in one part of the world does not take
long to spread and influence the healthy economies in another part of the world
through international stock markets, trading of countless financial instruments
or foreign bank loans. This process is known as cross–border contagion.
International contagion is closely related to systemic risk and plays a crucial
role in the banking sector crisis. Eichengreen et al. (1996) were among the first
to observe adverse effects of contagion phenomenon. They found evidence that
contagion contributed to currency crisis transmission mechanism. Since then,
the causes of contagion and its transmission channels have attracted intense
scrutiny. There is an extensive literature on how contagion relates to Asian,
Russian and even current financial crises (Allen & Gale 1999). For example,
Federal Reserve Bank of New York organized the bailout of Long Term Capital
Management hedge fund which it justified on the premise of containing the
contagion and limiting the spillovers to the largest extent possible (Lowenstein
2000). Padoa-Schioppa (2004) finds evidence that contagion which spread to
the interbank market resulted in the collapse of Japanese economy in 1990s.
Presently, in the context of the recent financial crisis the debate on contagion
re–emerged. The main goal is to identify the channels of transmission that
helped subprime mortgage crisis spread from U.S. market to Europe and then
to all emerging economies around the globe.
International contagion plays a significant role in examining the global econ-
omy in times of financial recessions. However, there are different opinions on
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the transmission mechanism through which it works. Masson (1998) distin-
guishes two main types of contagion: pure contagion and spillovers. Pure con-
tagion refers to the transmission of crises that cannot be explained by changes
of macroeconomic fundamentals or any direct linkages and spillovers between
the impaired economies. On the other hand, contagion can be a result of
spillovers. Economic researches commonly distinguish between spillovers via
trade (Eichengreen et al. 1996; Glick & Rose 1999) and via financial linkages
(Van Rijckeghem & Weder 2001).
In our research – which relates to the literature on financial linkages – we use
the distance to default as a measure of soundness of the bank (Crosby & Bohn
2003). The distance to default incorporates the information about stock returns
with market leverage and asset volatility that are the main determinants of
default risk. Following Bae et al. (2003) and Gropp et al. (2007), we concentrate
on the behavior of the negative tail of the distribution of the daily change in the
distance to default. Based on daily changes to distance to default, we define
how many banks are simultaneously experiencing large shocks on the same day
- “coexceedances”. We then employ multinomial logit model to estimate the
relationship between number of coexceedances in analyzed economies.
Our thesis aims to analyze whether there is contagion risk in the Nordic
countries (Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland). At the beginning of 1990s,
the Nordic countries experienced a severe banking crisis (Drees & Pazarbasioglu
1998; Sandal 2004; Koskenkylä 2000). It was a wake up call to implement better
policies in banking oversight and regulation together with new fiscal policies.
As a result, today the Nordic countries have best ratings from the main credit
rating agencies and are considered to be “safe–havens“ in financial markets.
Banking sectors in Nordic countries are notably similar in the structural as-
pects. It constitutes a significant part of countries’ economies, although the
relative size varies somewhat. Since 2001, the total assets from the banking
sector have increased significantly in each Nordic country. Moreover, each
banking sector is dominated by a few large banking groups. The Nordic coun-
tries are also highly integrated. Majority of foreign banks come from another
Nordic country and banks from non–Nordic countries represent only a small
percentage of the market.
The main question in this thesis is whether cross–border contagion is present
and statistically significant in the Nordic countries. The empirical research is
based on a multinomial logit regression model. The data sample covers all
continental Nordic countries, namely Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Finland.
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We also analyze what effect recent financial crises had on the cross–border
contagion in Nordic countries. We aim to find out if contagion effects intensified
and whether there appeared to be more linkages between the markets after the
crisis hit. Last but not least, we discuss differences and similarities across
all four continental Nordic countries and examine if some countries are more
exposed to cross–border contagion risk than other depending on the structure
of their banking sector.
The thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 provides and overview of the
existing literature on cross–border contagion and explains all necessary terms
and theories. The chapter is divided into two parts: the first part analyzes the
contagion and its causes, whereas the second one is dedicated for the empiri-
cal evidence on contagion and its structured according to methodologies used.
Chapter 3 introduces the reader to the Nordic banking sector. First, we shortly
describe the banking sector and its distinctive features. Then we turn back to
the Nordic banking crises in 1990s and briefly explain the impact on the Nordic
countries. Subsequently, we discuss major improvements in the Nordic banking
sector since the systemic crises and go deeper in analyzing the major problems
with cross–border banks. Finally, we conclude the chapter with the facts why
Nordic countries are considered to be “safe–havens” for international investors.
Chapter 4 describes the model choice and its methodology, the examined data,
hypotheses and assumptions. Finally, chapter 5 provides empirical analysis of
the cross–border contagion in the Nordic countries during 2004 – 2014 period.
It is based on multinomial logit model regression, where the dependent vari-
able is the distance–to–default for the banks in our sample. The second part
of the chapter is dedicated to statistical results explanation and interpretation.




Before we start discussing different channels of contagion, it is vital to un-
derstand what is meant by contagion and how it can be defined. As an example
we could refer to the 1998 Russian financial crisis. It had induced devaluation
of Russian ruble, which had influence on the Polish zloty depreciation. How-
ever, shortly after the crisis hit Russia, the Brazilian stock market shrank by
half of its size. Even without clear definition, we can conclude that what hap-
pened between these two markets was contagion. However, could we conclude
the same for Polish market since these two countries have always been closely
related in terms of international trades and financial interlinkages? Similarly,
if the U.S. stock market falls by 5 percent and it directly influences Canadian
stock market, does this account for contagion?
It is a challenging task to define contagion. On one hand, if the two countries
have different market structures and have no direct trades, the transmission of
a shock from one country to another could be straightforwardly accounted
for contagion. On the other hand, it is more difficult to distinguish between
contagion and only interdependence when it comes to countries that are closely
related in terms of financial trades and market structures. Such economies are
strongly financially connected during the stable periods as well as recessions.
So the transmission of shock from one economy to another could be caused by
interdependence and not be seen as a result of cross–border contagion.
Economists distinguish two types of contagion. The first one is so called
shift contagion and it is a narrower definition of contagion (Forbes & Rigobon
2001). It is defined as a change in the normal relationship between economies
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after a shock to a certain country. Shift contagion causes a substantial increase
in cross–border linkages in the crisis period. The second definition of contagion
is broader and more inclusive. It captures the susceptibility of one economy to
shocks that happen in other economies. In this case, it does not matter why
that susceptibility occurs and if those economies are connected with financial
links during tranquil as well as volatile periods (Claessens & Forbes 2004).
For a number of reasons, however, it is essential to differentiate between
broader and narrower definitions. Economists have to define the type of conta-
gion in order to evaluate the efficiency of intervention and financial support to
the impaired economies. In case of shift contagion, if one country is influenced
by a crisis that initiated in some other country and they do not have many
financial linkages, short–term loan is likely to be the most effective tool to sup-
port the economy. In case of broader contagion, however, if the two countries
were closely related through financial linkages, a crisis in one country would
force the other economy to adjust to this shock. Most economists focus on the
broader definition of contagion that captures the exposure of one country to fi-
nancial events in the other countries. There is an extensive literature on causes
of contagion. In the following sections we will discuss the possible sources and
transmission channels of contagion.
2.1 Contagion and Its Causes
Dornbusch et al. (2000) define contagion as the spread of market distur-
bances. It is transmitted from one country to another through a number of
different channels and it can be perceived through co–movements in macroe-
conomic. Forbes & Rigobon (2001) suggested dividing possible causes of con-
tagion into two groups–fundamental causes and investors’ behavior.
The first group considers spillovers that arise from interdependence among
economies. If economies have real financial linkages, transmission of a shock
from one economy to another is very likely to happen. This type of contagion
is also referred to “fundamental–based contagion” (Reinhart & Calvo 1996).
Normally such co–movement between asset prices in two different economies
would not be called contagion, however, if it occurs during the recession and
has negative effects, it still can be defined as contagion. Economists try to
understand the degree of co–movements and the transmission mechanism of
contagion, for instance, what causes a speculative attack on one currency to be
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transmitted to other currencies and how much it depends on financial linkages
between them.
The second group considers a transmission of shock not as a result of eco-
nomic interdependence but merely as a result of investors’ behavior. This time
it is not linked to changes in macroeconomic fundamentals and it arises even
when there are no global shocks causing the recession in several economies. In
this case, countries may not be financially interconnected since financial factors
are not important. Investors’ behavior causes a transmission of crisis from one
economy to another – a decline in one economy induces investors to withdraw
their investments not only from the deteriorated economy but from other econo-
mies as well without considering whether those economies are connected or have
similar macroeconomic fundamentals that might cause occurrence of the crisis
as well. Dornbusch et al. (2000) call this transmission a result of ‘irrational”
phenomena and conclude that is not related to macroeconomic fundamentals.
It is merely a result of financial panics and increased risk aversion.
2.1.1 Fundamental Causes
Fundamental causes or “fundamental–based contagion” refers to global and
domestic economic shocks that affect economies on an international level through
various fundamental linkages.
2.1.1.1 Common Shocks
This group includes common macroeconomic shocks also known as “mon-
soonal effect” , that have repercussions on an international level and domestic
shocks that are being spread to other economies through trade, competitive
devaluation and other financial channels (Masson 1998). Due to monsoonal
effect, a substantial economic shift in industrial countries, that could result
in global growth slowdown, initiates crisis in emerging markets. For instance,
Reinhart & Calvo (1996) observed that fluctuations in U.S. interest rate have
resulted in fluctuations in capital flows to Central and South America. Corsetti
et al. (1998) concluded that crisis in East Asia in 1997 was partly caused by
strengthening of the U.S. dollar against yen which resulted in decline in ex-
ports and consequently evolved into crisis. Generally, common shocks result
in co–movements in capital flows and asset prices. As an example we can also
refer to Moreno & Trehan (2000) who seek to ascertain the extent to which
common external shocks account for simultaneous crises. They define crisis
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on a country by country basis and take into account changes in volatility of
exchange rates over the time across selected countries. They conclude that
even a small number of common external shocks can explain quite a significant
part of the variation in the total number of crisis over some periods. Moreover,
they have found out that the global interest rates have an important role in
generating global financial problems and causing currency crises in developing
countries. Glick & Rose (1999) try to answer the question why currency crises
tend to be regional. They analyze five different currency crises and find that
currency crises negatively influence the groups of countries that are closely tied
by international trade. On the contrary, they conclude that macroeconomic
and financial factors cannot be directly associated with the frequency of cross–
country speculative attacks. Finally, we can perceive Fed tapering policy as
another type of common shocks and therefore it is important to analyze mar-
kets reaction to it. Mishra et al. (2014) analyzed how emerging markets react
to 2013–2014 Fed announcements related to tapering. They find evidence that
tapering announcements to asset purchases make markets behave differently
during volatile periods. Countries that have stronger fundamentals, deeper fi-
nancial markets, and more austere macroprudential policies experienced less
significant currency depreciations and not so sharp increases in government
bond yields. However, they also observed slighter differentiation in the stock
markets – stock prices varied less based on fundamentals.
2.1.1.2 Links and Competitive Devaluation
This group considers trade linkages and competitive devaluation as a po-
tential transmission channel for contagion. A crisis in one economy can have
adverse effects on other economies through trade and currency depreciations.
A country that is linked to a crisis country with depreciated currency would
experience fall in asset prices and significant capital outflows. Moreover, reces-
sion in one country would result in decrease in income and this would lead to
a reduced demand for imported goods. This would directly affect exports and
trade balances of major trading partners. Drazen (2000) argue that possibil-
ity of contagion in currency crises across countries is very likely. They aim to
explain how political factors can help explain contagion, especially the Euro-
pean Monetary System crisis of 1992–1993. If a country adopts fixed exchange
regime, and it’s main objective becomes maintenance of political integration
with its neighbors, then a devaluation of currency in one country will stimulate
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speculative attacks on the neighboring countries. This arguments is especially
relevant to EMS case.
Another possible transmission channel is competitive devaluation. If crisis
causes devaluation of a currency in one country, this reduces the relative export
of other countries that compete in third markets. Eventually, the effect of
competitive devaluation could put pressure on the other currencies to devalue.
Finally, a series of devalued currencies could result in even larger currency
devaluations than required initially. Thus devaluation and crises in emerging
markets become the source of entire economic collapse. This post–devaluation
economic breakup is contradictory to the conservative view that devaluation is
expansionary and therefore requires demand deflationary monetary and fiscal
policies (Yang & Lim 2004). Finally, Yang & Lim (2004) conclude that real
devaluation in Thailand was contractionary during the recession period, which
was the “trigger” economy in the East Asian crisis in 1997–1998. The other
prevailing view is that competitive Chinese market, particularly due to its
currency devaluation in 1994, and strong export performance during 1994–
1995 have contributed to the Asian crisis (Whitt 1999). However, Fernald et al.
(1999) find evidence against this view. They conclude that the devaluation was
not significant in economic terms, and that other Asian markets adjusted to
China’s strong export performance in 1994–1995. Corsetti et al. (1999) state
that competitive devaluation game is non–cooperative and so it results in more
severe depreciation than expected or what could be achieved in cooperative
game equilibrium. If investors expect that a currency crisis in one country
will evolve into a game of competitive devaluation, they will reconsider their
investments and probably sell their assets in other countries as well. This theory
is supported with the fact that during the East Asian crisis in 1997, economies
such as Singapore and China experienced currency depreciation even though
they did not seem to be vulnerable to a speculative attack based on their
fundamentals.
2.1.1.3 Financial Links
The most common fundamental cause of contagion is financial linkages. If a
group of countries is highly integrated, a crisis in one country would negatively
affect the other countries. It would result in decrease of trade credits, foreign
direct investments and other capital flows. More precisely, a crisis in one coun-
try could reduce its ability to supply capital to other countries such as bank
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lending and other forms of investment. This would extremely affect countries
that are dependent on external funding since borrowing costs would increase
sharply and currency would be forced to depreciate. Eichengreen et al. (1996)
analyze why frequent speculative attacks seem to be temporarily correlated, or
why currency crisis often appear to be contagious and spread from one econ-
omy to another. The research aims to answer the question what is the source
or nature of contagious currency crisis. Authors conclude that contagion tends
to spread more freely across economies which are highly connected with in-
ternational trade linkages than to economies that have similar macroeconomic
fundamentals. Haile & Pozo (2008) first test whether the currency crisis are
really contagious and furthermore aim to identify the possible contagion chan-
nels that help to spread contagion across economies. A major contribution of
the paper is the usage of extreme value theory to identify shocks and reces-
sion periods. Authors discuss four possible contagion channels instead of only
trade and macroeconomic fundamentals (as tested by Eichengreen et al. 1996
and Glick & Rose 1999) or only trade and finance (as tested by Kaminsky &
Reinhart 2000). Additionally, they consider the neighborhood effects channel.
Moreover, the trade linkage weights are calculated based not only on bilateral
imports and exports, as done in Eichengreen et al. (1996), but including third
party export markets as well. Glick & Rose (1999) and Van Rijckeghem &
Weder (2001) assume that crisis spread only from the “base countries” (coun-
tries were the crisis initiates). However, in reality there is a possibility of
acceleration meaning that initially crisis spreads to a second economy, how-
ever, the third economy receives negative effects already from both previously
impaired economies. Haile & Pozo (2008) do not have the same assumption
used by Glick & Rose (1999) and Van Rijckeghem & Weder (2001) and allow for
possibility of cascading effects. Finally, they conclude that trade channel is the
most common contagion channel. Additionally, they confirm that the chance
of crisis increases with the number of neighbor countries experiencing shocks
which supports the assumption that neighbor effects contributed to contagion
spread.
Baig & Goldfajn (1998) analyze the possibility of contagion between the fi-
nancial markets of Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Korea, and the Philippines.
They find evidence that correlations in currency and sovereign spreads jump up
substantially during the recession periods, however, behavior of equity market
differentiate somewhat. After controlling for domestic and international market
news and other fundamentals, they finally find contagion effects in cross–border
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equity markets as well. Caramazza et al. (2000) investigate what impact does
the foreign, domestic, and financial limitation as well as trade and financial
links have on financial crisis in emerging markets. They find that these in-
dicators are significant in explaining the Mexican, Asian, and Russian crises.
Moreover, indicators of vulnerability to cross–border financial spillovers (such
as common creditors) and of financial instability (such as capital adequacy) are
highly significant and can explain the observed regional concentrations of these
crises. Studies conclude that trade linkages are important in analyzing shock
transmission channels. Because countries in the same region are highly tied
with intraregional trades, it commonly leads to conclusion that this helps ex-
plain why contagion is often regional rather worldwide. However, with a couple
of exceptions, many studies failed to acknowledge the importance of financial
sector linkages (Baig & Goldfajn 1998; Frankel & Schmukler 1996).
2.1.2 Investor’s Behavior
Here we will discuss how investors’ behavior can be a possible transmission
channel of contagion. However, it is worth mentioning that some of the theories
classified as investors’ behavior can be linked to fundamentals and vice versa, so
it is not always easy to distinguish between these two groups. In other words,
if investors’ behavior is rational individually as well as collectively, this can be
subsumed to be fundamental cause of contagion because contagion is assumed
to be transmitted through financial linkages. Nonetheless, it can be argued
that investors’ behavior, rational or irrational, contribute to spreading shocks
across economies. Since investor’s behavior can be just as important contagion
channel as macroeconomic fundamentals and financial linkages, it is important
to analyze all possible types of investors’ behavior (see also Pritsker 2001).
Investors’ behavior can be ex ante individually rational but sometimes that
can lead to exaggerated co–movements that cannot be justified by economic
fundamentals. Through this channel of contagion, shocks are transmitted with
the help of investors’ behavior, although it is rational. Dornbusch et al. (2000)
suggest this type of behavior can be further divided into liquidity, incentives,
informational asymmetry and market coordination. Another explication of
contagious behavior can be attributed to multiple equilibrium, which is often
used to explain bank runs.
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2.1.2.1 Liquidity and Incentive Problems
Rational behavior often leads to liquidity constraints. For instance, East
Asian crisis resulted in currency depreciation and fall in equity prices in the
impaired economies, which finally led to huge capital losses for large institu-
tional investors. It has provoked investors to withdraw their investments in
other economies to protect themselves from even higher losses, which created
liquidity problems for the financial institutions. Banks may also experience liq-
uidity problems if its operations are concentrated in certain regions. Assume
there is a region that is highly reliant on one common creditor country, such as
Latin America and United States. If banks from the United States experience
a significant deterioration in the quality of their loans to one Latin American
country, they may try to reduce the total risk of their loan portfolios by cutting
their exposure to other high–risk investments in other countries. Peek & Rosen-
gren (2000) test whether a shortage of loan supplies in Japan can have negative
implications on real economic activities in the United States. The authors use
geographical variation to examine supply shocks: Japanese banks deprived of
capital as a result of bad loans issued in Japan. Finally, they conclude that
the withdrawal of these banks from lending activities in U.S. had a negative
slowing effect on US real estate markets. Nonetheless, it is not always realis-
tic to attribute the decrease in real activity to demand side effects. Cetorelli
& Goldberg (2008) show that the large internationally–oriented banks depend
on domestic capital markets and use their foreign associates to help facilitate
domestic liquidity shocks. Furthermore, they also show that the presence of
such domestic capital markets contributes to an international dissemination of
domestic liquidity shocks to lending by associate banks abroad. These results
signify a significantly more active lending channel than presented in the initial
work of Kashyap & Stein (2000), however, the lending channel within the U.S.
is becoming of less importance since banking sector becomes more globalized.
These results are confirmed by Cetorelli & Goldberg (2012), who also conclude
that the presence of domestic capital markets with foreign bank associates con-
tributes to transmission of domestic liquidity shocks to lending by affiliated
banks abroad.
2.1.2.2 Information Asymmetries and Coordination Problems
Information asymmetries can be another possible cause of contagion. When-
ever there is imperfect information problem and investors have different ex-
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pectations, financial crisis can easily spread from one market to another one
because investors believe that if crisis happen in one economy, this can lead to
recession in another economy in no time. A recession in one country may result
in currencies depreciations in the other countries that have similar fundamen-
tals. If this is the case, investors will behave rationally and withdraw their
investments in all countries with similar conditions and crisis that started this
turmoil will be considered as contagious (Dornbusch et al. 2000). However, this
type of transmission channel assumes the existence of imperfect information.
Investors do not know the true characteristics of each country and make as-
sessments based on expectations that are influenced by other economies rather
than the true characteristics that reflect the condition of specific country’s vul-
nerability to the crisis. This leads us to informational asymmetries problem.
Whenever investors are limited to the information about the true conditions
of each economy, it affects their investments. However, information collection
and processing is often costly.
Calvo & Mendoza (2000) emphasize the significance of information asym-
metries and costs in obtaining information about particular economies, which
leads to herd behavior by international investors as a major cause of contagion.
They propose a model where investors are separated into two groups: informed
and uninformed. Considering the high expenses of collecting and processing
the country specific information, many small investors cannot afford to do it
individually. In this way, uninformed investors could base their decisions on
informed investors actions, rather than their own expectations and beliefs.
Agénor & Aizenman (1997) interpret contagion as an increase in the volatil-
ity of shocks. They employ a model where domestic banks borrow from inter-
national capital markets and domestic producers borrow from domestic banks
like this reducing the costs of information gathering. Uninformed investors
such as domestic producers follow the patterns of larger investors who often
are better informed. The same strategy applies to portfolio structuring where
small investors follow the decisions of large investors in asset choices because
their decisions incorporate market information. Kim & Wei (2002) suggest
that investors are motivated to follow the herd to maintain the reputation.
Investors are becoming more distinct over time and good reputation becomes
rather expensive so their decision to follow the patterns of other investors is less
costly. Since the reputation of investors depends on their managed portfolios,
self–sustaining behavior can become quite risky. Fearing the risk of losing the
reputation, institutional investors refuse to make decision first, even if market
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growth approves a composition of new portfolio. In order to be on the safe
side, they rather follow decisions of the other investors. Such behavior is still
considered to be rational, even though it is based on constraints. However, it
does not protect from financial instability (Dornbusch et al. 2000).
2.1.2.3 Multiple Equilibriums
A broader explanation of contagion is related to changes in investors’ expec-
tations and confidence. Calvo & Mendoza (1997) developed a theory related
to investors’ behavior that focuses on market coordination problems. Investors
adjust their behavior based on self–fulfilling expectations that can create multi-
ple equilibriums. Contagion occurs when a crisis in one economy causes another
economy to move to a bad equilibrium, meaning depreciation of a currency, a
fall in equity prices, capital outflows, or debt defaults. Diamond & Dybvig
(1983) developed a model, which has been extensively used to analyze bank
runs and its causes. They show that individual investors base their decisions
on the actions of other investors, that means withdraw their deposits only if
other investors do. This results in either bad equilibrium when bank experi-
ences bank run or in a good equilibrium if investors keep their deposits in the
bank. Analogically to bank run, economic crisis can affect the whole economy.
Economy could suffer sudden withdrawals of investments if investors’ confidence
level shift significantly. That is why some economists argue that contagion is a
result of sudden shifts in market expectations and confidence. The first multi-
ple equilibriums theories aimed to explain crisis in emerging markets (Gerlach
& Smets 1995). However, it is not easy to apply it empirically, because it
did not control for some factors, such as fundamental causes so it is hard to
distinguish between contagion caused by investors’ behavior and fundamentals.
2.2 Empirical Evidence on Contagion
Most empirical work testing for evidence of contagion has relied on co–
movements in asset prices. The following is the summary of the most significant
researches on financial contagion. We follow Dungey et al. (2004) and classify
the methods into the following categories: correlation approach, probability–
based approach, extreme returns test, and alternative approaches. The lat-
ter contains methodologies based on measures of capital flow movements and
volatility spillovers.
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2.2.1 Correlation Approach
One of the most common ways to empirically test for contagion is to use the
asset price tests. Studies compare the correlation coefficients of macroeconomic
fundamentals such as interest rates and asset prices across different markets. A
significant increase in coefficients is concluded to be the evidence of contagion.
Usually, these studies observe large co–movements in the asset returns, however,
there has been some disagreements whether these co–movements intensify in
the periods of recession. Reinhart & Calvo (1996) state that co–movements on
equity returns intensified in emerging markets in Asia and Latin America after
the Mexican crisis in 1994. Moreover, Frankel & Schmukler (1996) prove that
the co–movements in prices of country funds in Latin America, East Asia, and
Mexico increased significantly after the crisis, which confirms that the Mexican
crisis was significantly contagious. They also suggest that domestic and inter-
national investors may have been differently informed claiming that domestic
investors in Mexico lost their confidence before investors in the United States.
Moreover, authors propose that shocks do not necessarily spread directly from
one emerging market to another and that very often a third market is involved.
Baig & Goldfajn (1998) confirm the evidence of contagion in East Asian
crisis in 1997–1998. They tested for evidence of contagion between the finan-
cial markets of Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Korea, and the Philippines and
found that cross–border correlations among currencies and sovereign spreads
increased during the recession period. However, a significant increase in cor-
relations among different economies may not be enough to prove evidence of
contagion. If markets are financially interdependent, a significant change in
prices in one market will force changes in other markets as well. Forbes &
Rigobon (2002) argue that increase in volatility and correlations during the re-
cession could be a result of transmission mechanism that exist in calm periods
as well as during the crises periods. Moreover, they show that an increase in
correlations of asset prices be a result of correlation between macroeconomic
fundamentals, investors’ risk perception and preferences, and not an evidence
of contagion. If we face endogeneity problem, in order to find evidence of conta-
gion, it is necessary to control for co–movements in these variables as well as in
fundamentals during stable periods. Some economists have taken this into con-
sideration. Forbes & Rigobon (2002) checked for contagion during the Mexican
crisis in 1994, East Asian crisis in 1997 and U.S stock market recession in 1987
using daily volatilities. The results of the research confirmed that correlation
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coefficients across countries are not significantly higher during the recessions, if
such problems as endogeneity, omitted variable bias and heteroscedasticity are
controlled for. Corsetti et al. (2005) criticise work of Forbes & Rigobon (2002)
and claim that their result of no contagion is achieved by setting unrealistic as-
sumptions on the volatility of country–specific shocks. They focus on the Hong
Kong stock market crash in October 1997, which was also the leading case study
of Forbes & Rigobon (2002), and find that contagion is present in at least five
countries. Favero & Giavazzi (2000) studied Exchange Rate Mechanism crisis
by modeling volatility of European interest rates to test for contagion. The
results were positive, i.e. they found evidence of contagion in the residuals of
interest rates even after controlling for normal interdependencies.
2.2.2 Probability–Based Approach
The second group of studies uses conditional probabilities models, which
control for normal interdependencies in fundamentals and help detecting con-
tagion. Eichengreen et al. (1996) suggested the methodology that examines
whether the probability of crisis in one country is higher if the other countries
are facing recession as well. This methodology is a continuation of studies done
by Dornbusch et al. (1995) where they aimed to estimate model for crisis predic-
tion in a single economy . The research done by Eichengreen et al. (1996) aimed
to estimate the probability of crisis occurrence in one economy conditional on
information of crisis in other economies after controlling for interdependencies
in macroeconomic fundamentals. These test can differentiate between different
channels of contagion, such as trade and financial linkages, and test for conta-
gion for each of them; however, the main advantage of conditional probabilities
model is that it does not require knowing the particular channel of contagion
in order to test for its presence. Eichengreen et al. (1996) proved that trade
links are more likely to assist contagion as a transmission channel than the
macroeconomic fundamentals. In their research they employed probit model
to show that the likelihood of domestic currency crisis increases if some other
currency is being infected by speculative attack. The evidence of contagion is
constantly questioned. The common argument is that when several economies
are attacked simultaneously this is not the evidence of contagion but rather
weak macroeconomic fundamentals. Eichengreen et al. (1996) respond to such
critics by including the incidence of crises elsewhere to the common domestic
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factors of currency crises. Finally, they conclude that the presence of a currency
crises elsewhere increases the chances of a shock on the home currency.
De Gregorio & Valdes (2001) used similar approach to analyze how external
crisis could spread across the borders. They analyzed the co–movements of
alternative crisis indicators for 20 countries during the Asian crisis in 1997,
Mexican crisis in 1994 and debt crisis in 1982. They concluded that that
Mexican crisis was less contagious comparing with Asian and debt crisis. Due to
methodology used, however, they could not determine whether spillovers were
caused by contagion or by fundamental co–movements between the markets.
Furthermore, they found that debt structure and flexible exchange rate regime
could reduce the contagion, while capital regulations do not seem to influence
it. It is worth mentioning that Caramazza et al. (2000) analyzed the same
crises using the approach suggested by Eichengreen et al. (1996), however, it
presented rather different results. They argued that these crises did not differ
significantly in terms of contagion. Moreover, the results showed that such
fundamentals as common creditors and financial instability are significant in
explaining crisis while an exchange rate regime as well as capital controls do
not have any significant effect on that.
Bordo & Murshid (2000) took a slightly different perspective and tested the
crises over the last century in order to answer the question whether financial
crises are becoming more contagious over time. The results showed that the
main countries of the prewar and interwar gold standard (the United King-
dom and United States) were responsible for transmitting the shocks to other
economies, nonetheless during the crises this pattern seemed to weaken. Fur-
thermore, after 1973, countries that are not interdependent showed significant
co–movements in asset prices during the recessions. However, the results also
showed high volatility on correlation coefficients, which prevented the authors
to interpret the increase in correlations as the evidence of contagion, since
Forbes & Rigobon (2002) suggested that such spreads might be common. All
factors considered, authors did not find strong evidence that contagion has been
intensifying over the years. Glick & Rose (1999) apply a similar methodology
to prove that currency crises are more likely to be regional. They use data
for five different currency crises and prove that currency crises affect groups
of countries that are closely connected by international trade. Moreover, they
claim that contagion is more likely to be regional rather than global because
trade linkages are stronger between countries in the same region compared to
countries from different regions (see also Diwan & Hoekman 1999). Kaminsky
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& Reinhart (1998) claim that methodology based on conditional probabilities
help predict crises in another country if some countries from the same region
face crises. Furthermore, likewise Glick & Rose (1999), they support the idea
that contagion is more regional rather than global problem (see also Frankel
& Schmukler 1996; Kaminsky & Schmukler 2001). Moreover, trade linkages
happen to be more important to Latin America than to East Asia as a trans-
mission channel of contagion. Kaminsky & Reinhart (1998) found evidence
that in case of Latin American countries, there is a high probability that cri-
sis could be transmitted through third–party linkages while analogous linkages
have no substantial influence on East Asian countries. Baig & Goldfajn (1998)
studied East Asian crisis in 1997. They found that East Asian countries did
not have strong trade linkages with each other; therefore, such linkages could
not be accounted for the expansion of the crisis.
2.2.3 Extreme Returns Test
The methodology built on extreme returns has attracted a lot of attention
because extreme contractions in stock markets may have severe implications for
the portfolios of institutional investors. Many researchers focus on the events
in the negative tail of the distribution of returns, with the aim of getting a
better understanding for value-at-risk applications.
Bae et al. (2003) suggests a new approach to measure contagion in financial
markets. They employ extreme value theory to capture extreme return shocks
across analyzed markets. They conclude that contagion is detectable and is in-
fluenced by such factors as domestic interest rates, variation in exchange rates,
and conditional domestic volatility. However, they fail to conclude that conta-
gion is stronger for extreme negative returns. Gropp et al. (2007) build their
methodology based on Bae et al. (2003) work and analyze contagion among Eu-
ropean banks in the period 1994–2004. They apply two–staged methodology
to test for contagion. First they calculate distance to default measure for each
bank in the chosen sample and in order to calculate how many banks experience
shocks conditional on other domestic and European banks experiencing shocks
at the same day – “coexceedances”. Afterwards, they apply multinomial logit
model to test how contagious are banking sectors in selected European coun-
tries. They find significant evidence of contagion in some European countries.
However, there are also some countries that seem to be resistant to contagion
risk. They claim that this is a result of their low cross – border interbank ex-
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posures. They also conclude that introduction of euro had enhanced contagion
risk across the markets. Finally, they claim that large banks are more likely
to be exposed to contagion risk compared to the smaller ones, which is in line
with their previous result that banks with low exposures are less precarious.
This type of methodology does not precisely measure one particular transmis-
sion channel of contagion. The dependent variable used in these researches –
distance to default – is derived from equity price data allowing to measure con-
tagion as seen by bank’s shareholders. DD measure indicates bank’ weaknesses
and summarizes all necessary information about a bank. Therefore this type
of methodology is considered to be an advantage.
2.2.4 Alternative Approaches
2.2.4.1 Capital Flows
Measuring capital flows co–movements is another approach to test the trans-
mission of contagion. This type of tests could probably offer the best insight,
however, not so many economists rely on it. Van Rijckeghem & Weder (1999)
studied Mexican, Asian and Russian crisis. They find evidence that spillovers
through bank lending were a transmission channel for crisis to emerging mar-
kets. Moreover, they conclude that spillovers helped forecast capital flows in
third countries after the Mexican and East Asian crisis. Finally, they claim
that contagion risk can be mitigated by diversifying their creditors and by
preventing borrowing from the creditors that are exposed to crisis countries.
Froot et al. (2001) explore the daily flows for international portfolios for emerg-
ing markets for the period 1994 – 1998. They conclude that increase in prices
leads to higher portfolio flows and vice versa. Their results also show that
common creditor factor in a region seems to be more and more important over
time which suggests that institutional investors’ behavior could contribute to
transmission of shocks. Kaminsky et al. (2000) analyse portfolio and mutual
funds trading strategies. They find evidence of positive momentum trading:
fund managers systematically buy winners and sell losers. In the crisis pe-
riod managers follow contemporaneous momentum trading – they sell current
losers and buy current winners. Meanwhile, in the normal times managers fol-
low lagged momentum – they sell past losers and buy past winners. They also
find evidence that fund managers and investors profit from contagion trading
– they sell assets in one market if they see drop in prices in other markets and
vice versa. Moreover, authors conclude that the contemporaneous momentum
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trading reached the highest point during the Mexican crisis in 1994. Kamin-
sky et al. (2000) claim that contagion strategies used by fund managers play a
major role in transmission of contagion from one country to another.
2.2.4.2 Volatility Spillovers
Examination of cross–market movements is another way to test for conta-
gion. Edwards (1998) studied the Mexican Peso crisis in 1994 and found strong
evidence that this crisis was contagious only towards some countries in Latin
America. Park & Song (1998) did similar studies on volatility spillovers among
newly industrialized East Asian economies during the recession period. Their
conclusion suggested that the Southeast Asian crisis did not directly initiate
the crisis in Korea, but instead it had direct negative consequences on Taiwan’s
economy, which later on played significant role in causing Korean crisis. How-
ever, both studies above did not control for global macroeconomic shocks so it
was not possible to distinguish whether there was evidence of pure contagion or
it resulted from fundamental linkages across countries. The available literature
on sovereign credit default swaps contagion is rather limited. Chen et al. (2011)
studied the Argentinian sovereign crisis and found significant increase in corre-
lation between Argentinian and other Latin American sovereign CDS spreads.
Arghyrou & Kontonikas (2012) studied EMU debt crisis and conclude that in
the early phase of crisis contagion was mainly originating from Greece, while
in the latter period involved more countries as potential contagion initiators
and transmitters. Alter & Beyer (2012) used a similar methodology and found
significant linkages not only between sovereign credit markets itself but also
between sovereign credit markets and European banks. Alter & Schüler (2012)
study the dependence between the default risk of chosen Eurozone countries and
their domestic banks during the recent crises, employing credit default swap
spreads as a risk measure. Their conclusion proposes that before banks received
capital injections the contagion was spreading from banks credit spreads into
sovereign credit default swaps market. After bailouts, authors observe stronger
adverse effects to sovereign CDS in the short run. However, they conclude that
these effects become of no consequence in the long run. Moreover, they find
strong relations between government CDS and banks’ CDS spreads. The de-
pendence of government and bank credit risk is miscellaneous across different
countries but homogeneous within the same country. Beirne et al. (2009) ex-
amine the volatility spillovers from developed to emerging markets. They also
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test how transmission channels modify during volatile periods in developed
markets, and examine the significance of conditional correlations between de-
veloped and emerging market returns. First of all, the invoked LR tests suggest
that volatility in developed countries influence conditional volatilities in emerg-
ing markets. Furthermore, spillover effects change during the volatile episodes
– conditional correlations between emerging and developed markets tend to in-
crease during these periods. They also conclude that the conditional volatility
increases more in developed economies than emerging ones, which explains the
increase in conditional correlations between markets. Diebold & Yilmaz (2009)
study the dependencies between asset return spillovers and volatility spillovers.
In their analysis they cover 19 global equity markets for the last 20 years, which
naturally includes tranquil and volatile episode. They find evidence that the
asset return spillovers have tendency of slight increase over the years but dis-
play no major outbursts, whereas volatility spillovers present opposite results
of no clear tendencies but significant outbursts during crisis episodes.
Chapter 3
Banking Sector in Nordic Countries
3.1 Introducing the Nordic Banking Sector
Continental Nordic countries are known for their particular strength and
stability in the financial sector. Therefore, it was assumed that these countries
would be coping with the recent financial crisis more efficiently. In fact, all
of the Nordic countries suffered systemic banking crisis in the early 1990s, so
it was expected that they have learned a lesson. In the case of Finland, the
consequences of systemic crisis were more severe than after Great Recession in
1929 (Mayes 2009). This fact notwithstanding, collective myopia has a critical
element of short lasting memory of previous recessions, and it leads economies
to a new crisis. Furthermore, it is the unpromising reality that governments fail
to prepare for these low–probability occasions that have disastrous outcomes.
For these two reasons, it was anticipated that the Nordic region would cope
better with the current financial turmoil than most of the leading economies.
However, what we saw in practice let us conclude that Nordic countries did
not learn from their mistakes, as Iceland’s economy suffered the most severe
consequences. In Denmark’s case, there was a large number of bank failures.
Swedish banking sector also felt quite severe repercussions mostly because it is
highly exposed to the Baltic region which was hardly hit by the crisis. Obvi-
ously if the countries with the painful experience from the past did not respond
adequately we cannot expect or even be surprised that others have been caught
short by the recession. However, the picture is not definite since the severity
of the crisis varied across countries remarkably and hence no single lesson can
be drawn. Still, we observe a more general pattern and can conclude that the
countries which were hardest hit by systemic crisis in 1990s, suffered milder
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aftermaths of economic recession that started in 2007. Iceland sidestepped and
Denmark had only mild consequences of the systemic crisis in 1990s but paid
back the price two decades later (Mølgaard 2003).
Nordic banking sector is driven by six largest banks which dominate markets
in all four Nordic countries and account for approximately 90 percent of all
listed Nordic banks. These banks have activities across the region, and their
assets constitute to around 230 and 360 percent of gross domestic product in
Denmark and Sweden, respectively1. If we combine foreign assets and liabilities
of the Nordic banks, they constitute around 150 percent of all Nordic region
GDP, which points to the large–scale of the cross–border operations within
Nordic region. It is worth mentioning that the number presented represent
only publicly–listed banks.
Figure 3.1: Total Assets of Publicly–Listed Nordic–4 Banks
Sources: Annual Reports and IMF staff calculations.
The Nordic banking sector is unique due to its extensive integration within
the region. While operations in the Baltic states and other European markets
are sizable, the most substantial exposure of the six largest banks is to the
Nordic region and constitutes about 85 percent of their credit portfolio.
Similarly, the proportion of large banks sovereign bond exposure to the
region is about 75 percent. Leverage ratios of Nordic banks are stable and
only slightly higher than in other European banks. However, it provides much
better access to international capital markets at often lower rates than major
1Inclusion of unlisted Danish mortgage banks such as Realkredit and Totalkredit would
enhance the banking sector to around 360 percent of GDP.
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European banking systems. The financial crisis that started in 2007 in U.S.
had a negative impact on some of the large Nordic banks and resulted in more
restricted access to foreign markets, however, when global financial turmoil
evolved to the euro area crisis, it had almost no impact on Nordic banks. On
the contrary, Nordic banks benefited from a “safe–haven” status and lower
credit default swap spreads than the majority of other European banks.
Figure 3.2: Credit Portfolio Exposure of Six Largest Banks by Geog-
raphy, 2012
Sources: Annual Reports and IMF staff calculations.
The major Nordic banks are strongly dependent on wholesale funding, in-
cluding covered bonds. It is a result of a shortage of deposits caused by house-
holds’ preferences for pension schemes and investment products. The main
Nordic banks finance half of their assets with customer deposits and the other
half they borrow from domestic and international interbank and debt capi-
tal markets. Nordic banks benefit from the recycling of retail savings that
are driven by tax incentives and culture of financial investment in domestic
pension funds and insurance products. Institutional investors are required to
invest in domestic currency assets to match their liabilities. In Scandinavia, the
government bonds have relatively low rate that leads to very few investment
options; bank papers one of those. That is the reason, why covered bonds are
an important source of financing in Nordic banking sector. The major Nordic
banks have issued the covered bonds for nearly EUR 500 billion by the end of
2012 which amounts to approximately 70 percent of all covered bonds issued
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in Nordic countries. Altogether, the covered bonds issued in Nordic–4 account
for approximately 35 percent of global outstanding covered bonds and approxi-
mately 60 percent of all bonds issued in 2011. Denmark together with Germany
has the oldest covered bond markets in Europe. Across Nordic–4, Danish and
Swedish markets are the largest in terms of a percent of GDP and over 75
percent of all bonds issued are in domestic currencies, and only 20 percent of
covered bonds are issued in euro currency.
3.2 The Nordic Banking Crises in the Early 1990s
All four continental countries experienced recession in the late 1980s and
early 1990s. Denmark was the first one to be hit by the crises, however the
ravage was the least disastrous. Over a hundred financial institutions ceased
to exist over eight years period. Most common solution was a merger with
bigger and more sound institutions. The remaining institutions preferred gov-
ernment bailout than to go bankrupt, however, the decision was mostly based
on potential costs. Roughly out of 100 institutions only eight banks declared
bankruptcy. Support from the government did not change form of the own-
ership of rescued institutions, there was no special organization formed for
rescuing the banks, rescued banks were not labeled as “bad” banks, neither
any guarantees were issued (Mølgaard 2003). Moreover, according to Statistics
Denmark, the economy did not experience any major downturn although there
were a number of quarters between 1987 and 1991 in which there was a decline
in gross domestic product.
After Denmark, it was Norway’s turn. According to Moe et al. (2004), in
the years 1988–1990 13 small banks declared bankruptcy. However, this was
not considered to be part of systemic crises, although the economy experienced
some decline in the first half of 1989. The actual systemic crises hit Norway in
1991–1992 when the second and fourth largest banks deprived of all their capital
and the largest bank lost roughly 90 percent of it. The government inserted
the required amounts of capital into impaired banks after wiping out or writing
off the shareholders according to their detriment. The government later sold
majority of these stakes and was able to make surplus on these transactions
even after allowing for discounting, however, the costs to the society were more
destructive.
Jonung (2010) observes that the magnitude of crises in Sweden were similar
to that in Norway, although provisioning made by the banks were the greatest
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and most cautious of all four countries. In the beginning of 1991, the govern-
ment provided bailouts for third largest bank, Nordbanken, in which it was also
a stakeholder, as well as for largest savings bank in Sweden. However, unlike
in Denmark or Norway, here the government after bailing out labeled them
as ‘bad banks’ for impaired conditions and issued guarantees against creditor
losses. According to Statistics Sweden, economy experienced sharp recession
in 1991–1992 and as a result was displaced from the exchange rate mechanism
(ERM) despite very intense defense (Gordon 2000).
Finland was the last one of four countries to be hit by the crisis, however,
the repercussions were the most disastrous. To realize the scale of intensity of
the crisis in each country we look at the public sector support as a percentage of
GDP in gross terms: in Denmark, it was only about 0.5 percent, Norway – 2.6
percent, Sweden – 6.1 percent, and Finland devoted 17.2 percent (Hsu 2013).
The Finnish economy suffered significant decline when the GDP fell by 12.6
percent over the period of 1991–1993. The equally critical was the impact on
unemployment when just in three years it raised by 15 percent. Systemic crisis
has hit Finland more harshly than Great Depression in 1929 in terms of GDP,
however, we have to stress that at that time Finland had very impoverished
economy so the repercussions were ever harder (Honkapohja 2009).
A main explanation for the crisis was the reaction of banks to the deregu-
lation of the financial sector. Denmark was the only country that had adapted
important capital adequacy requirements, as this was the origin of the intro-
duction of the Basel standards. However, the situation deteriorated due to
unbalanced macro–economic policies, mainly trying to maintain exchange rate
pegs. Moreover, this was another example of crisis associated and caused by
major rises in asset prices. In case of Finland, the collapse of the former Soviet
Union also had intense negative impact on the economy.
3.3 Development in Nordic Banking Sector: A
Problem of Cross–Border Banks
At the time the Nordic crises hit, all the banks in the region had very little
international operations – they were almost completely national. Their opera-
tions abroad, even the ones with other Nordic countries, constituted very small
part to their revenues compared to their domestic activities. Therefore, the
internal supervision institutions and central banks were solely responsible for
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assuring the financial stability in their economies. However, they also had the
ability to handle all financial systems alone since no other countries or foreign
institutions were involved. The situation has changed radically since then. At
the beginning of the current financial crises, majority of banks ran their op-
erations across national borders. Nordea is Finland’s largest bank, however,
it is quartered in Sweden. Its second largest bank is Danske bank, which has
quarters in Denmark. That helps us to draw clear picture of Finnish bank-
ing sector, and we can conclude that at the moment majority of its banking
sector and supervision is in foreign hands. Largest Swedish banks have sig-
nificantly expanded their activities across Nordic countries, as well as Baltic
states. Largest Swedish bank Nordea is a leading bank in Sweden and Finland.
However, it also has a substantial market share in Denmark and Norway. Dur-
ing the current financial turmoil, the large banks with the significant share of
foreign operations were the ones that faced the worst problems, but not neces-
sarily the largest losses (see also Hardie & Howarth 2009). However, this does
not necessarily mean that they would have coped with the problems better if
they were solely national banks.
When the crisis strike, it’s not only the largest banks that suffer devastating
consequences. In fact, it is very rare that a large bank would fail on its liabilities
or that largest institutions would allow it to fail. The more considerable impact
is normally on small banks that are not strong enough to survive the financial
turmoil. If the likely impact is that small banks will default on its liabilities
and declare bankruptcy, there are commonly two possible scenarios. The most
likely way out is that one of the major banks in the country or even region will
purchase the defaulting banks at an advantageous price and take over all of
its obligations. In such case, there will be no interruption of activities and no
problems to the customers. However, shareholders of the defaulting bank will
suffer substantial losses. The second option is that the bank will not be saved
and will be allowed to default and declare bankruptcy. The deposit insurer
will step in to protect insured deposits. However, here the impact will be more
severe. First of all, the shareholders lose the entire value of the shares they hold.
Also, the junior debt holders experience losses since they are not protected the
same way as insured deposit holders. One good example is the case of Roskilde
bank in Denmark. This bank ran into financial troubles due to the recession
of the Danish property market and in the middle of 2008 was acquired by
Danmarks Nationalbank that provided some financial support. The bank was
allowed to collapse. However, the authorities have provided a redemption plan
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that enabled the obligations and branches to be taken over by other financial
institutions. Denmark’s National Bank has not used such rescue schemes in
the Nordic systemic crisis and , in fact, has not helped a bank directly since the
Great Depression. Even though Roskilde was a small bank, it was important
to support its existence in any way.
Whenever the impact of the crisis is so large that a large bank or a number
of smaller banks experience severe problems, there are always doubts about
the integrity of the system. Whenever the larger financial intermediaries are
not able to acquire the defaulting banks, a more extensive support is needed.
In the Nordic countries, considering the previous crises and its consequences,
it is expected for the state to step in, in order to prevent the possible failures
and to assure help for rescue plans. An important step would be to offer
guarantees against losses. Such guarantees would stand together with existing
deposit insurance and hopefully would help troubled banks to raise additional
funds backed by these guarantees. Bank runs initiated by investors’ fears not
to get repaid is what leads banks to failure. Even if the bank can meet its
obligations, a significant withdraw of funds at once generates the failure that
the investors were initially worried about. The largest losses will be incurred
by those who are unable to withdraw or by uninformed investors, which are
normally depositors.
Cross–border banking undoubtedly complicates the situation in times of
turmoil. However, Nordic countries encountered a number of problems in their
system solving the question of defaulting banks. The most important issue was
the failure to organize a systematic payout to depositors. The problem was
not shortage of funds, but the fact that the systems did not know how to deal
with such rapid payouts. Important remark is that the EU law indicates that
insured depositors are required to be paid in the next three months. Thus,
if depositors saw any signs that it would be impossible to find a buyer for
defaulting bank, they would run on the banks and withdraw their funds, even
though they are insured, as nobody wants to lose access to funds for even short
period (Kaufman 2006).
In the aftermath of Nordic systemic crisis, authorities implemented two
main solutions. One was to inject the required amount of capital into impaired
bank, which was often done by merging it with another sound bank, and then let
them work resolve issues on their own, however, with the substantial amount of
supervision. Another solution was to ignore impaired assets and label affected
bank as ‘bad bank’. Sweden and Finland decided to adopt the latter solution
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while Norway was following the former. These bad banks cease to exist when
the last impaired asset matures. In order to help the borrowers, some loans
were prolonged for longer periods. When the impaired assets are kept in the
existing bank, the incentives to solve the issues faster will be distinctly higher,
even if it means discounting bad assets and selling it. During the years, Nordic
countries do not seem to have changed their minds over the usefulness and
appropriateness of these options.
In order to effectively solve issues related to cross–border bank, countries
should have to get together and create an efficient rescue plan. Relatively
closed region as Nordic countries would be a good example for implementation
of such practice. The dismal reality shows that if the cross–border bank is
experiencing some difficulties, it is normally the home country that is burdened
with the whole problem. And since the cross–border banks are normally all of
sufficient sizes, the home authorities will take all necessary measure to keep the
bank from defaulting even if it requires to go to extremes and results in severe
consequences for society.
3.4 The Nordic–4 as Safe–Havens
During the recent financial crises, the investors perceived the Nordic coun-
tries as safe havens due to its stable economies and a history of strict fiscal
disciplines. Nordics proved themselves to deserve this title in various ways,
such as appreciating exchange rates and setting interest rates at very low lev-
els.
• Denmark’s currency is pegged to the euro which has let some investors
perceive it as a hedge against severe euro zone crisis, with international
reserves growing by 250 percent since autumn 2008, to over 20 percent
of GDP. Price effects have been realized together with a negative policy
rate for certificates of deposits and 3–month uncollateralized interbank
borrowing;
• Finland shared the crisis experience with other “core” euro area members.
Its sovereign yields have reached the same level as in Germany and safe–
haven flows contributed to the increase in Target II balances to around 30
percent of GDP on average over 2012. These balances represent internal
euro zone deposit changes and current account financing provided by the
official sector (e.g., via the Emergency Liquidity Assistance);
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• Norway has retained full control over its monetary policy. Its trade–
weighted exchange rate appreciate by more than 15 percent since De-
cember 2008. Moreover, bank deposits from the rest of the globe have
jumped by 25 percent since the summer of 2011;
• Sweden moved to floating exchange rate regime in 1992. Its trade–
weighted exchange rate has decreased by just over 20 percent since early
2009 as results of currency appreciation against the value of its main trad-
ing partners. Foreign exchange reserves have also expanded, though this




In the following section we develop and formulate the research hypothesis
based on the existing literature and previous findings as well as our predictions
about the Nordic banking sector.
As discussed in previous chapter, Nordic countries are known for its finan-
cial strength and stability as well as high interconnectedness across all four
markets. The discussion on the need for banking sector regulation and super-
vision relies crucially on the issue whether there is cross–border contagion risk
in banking, or not. Reviewed studies showed that contagion is economically
and statistically significant in many countries around the globe (Reinhart &
Calvo 1996; Eichengreen et al. 1996; Baig & Goldfajn 1998; Gropp et al. 2007).
This leads us to our first hypothesis raised in this research:
Hypothesis 1: Cross–border contagion is present and statistically significant
in the Nordic countries: collapse of banks in one Nordic country would have
negative effect in another Nordic country.
Furthermore, many studies have been devoted to test the behavior of crisis
and whether the effects of contagion intensify in the aftermath of any ma-
jor turmoils (Frankel & Schmukler 1996; De Gregorio & Valdes 2001; Corsetti
et al. 2005). Moreover, Forbes & Rigobon (2002) claim that sometimes what is
perceived to be contagion is, in fact, only interdependence between financially
connected markets. Therefore, we want to measure if Nordic region is exposed
to contagion risk and if this risk intensifies in the times of financial distress. It
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is important to understand the connection between the crisis and the contagion
effects and take actions accordingly. This leads us to our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Recent financial crises have intensified the cross–border con-
tagion across all Nordic countries.
Last but not least, we do not analyze any particular channel of contagion
in our research. However, the banks in our sample are very heterogeneous.
We expect to conclude that some countries with large foreign active banks are
more exposed to contagion risk. That would help us conclude that some con-
tagion transmission channels are more likely than others. This assumption is
based on analysis by Minoiu & Reyes (2011), who suggest that contagion could
be transmitted through cross–border lending. We know that in cross–border
lending, large banks play a dominant role, and, therefore, we finally arrive to
our third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Banking sectors with high share of large internationally ac-
tive banks have higher exposure to cross–border contagion risk.
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4.2 Data Description
The purpose of our empirical research is to analyze how contagious are
the banking sectors in our selected countries. The methodology builds on the
existing empirical literature, especially on Bae et al. (2003) who propose a new
approach to measure financial contagion to emerging markets, and Gropp et al.
(2007) who analyze contagion within European banks.
Our data sample covers 4 Nordic countries, namely Denmark, Sweden, Nor-
way and Finland. The Nordic countries are a geographical region which also
includes Iceland. However, due to our chosen methodology, we had to drop
Iceland since it does not have data needed for our research1. Selecting our data
sample we started with all the banks in Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland
that are listed at the stock exchange. We analyze banks performance for ten
years period – from January 2004 to January 2014. We dropped all the banks
whose data was not available for the entire period. The two selection criteria
help us to get rid of all banks with questionable data quality and complete
our data set 2. Our final data set contains 16 banks in total (see Table 4.1).
We believe that contagion is a short–term phenomenon, therefore, in order to
capture it, we have to use high–frequency – daily data. Each bank contains
2,507 daily observations, making the total sample of 40,112 observations (see
Table 4.2). The chosen banks are quite large relative to the banks population
in Nordic region. Moreover, six of the banks in our sample are listed between
100 largest banks in the world, which reflects the strength of Nordic financial
system. On average, total assets of our sample banks amount to EUR 145
billion (median: EUR 39 billion). The relatively high average is not surprising,
and it is a result of the requirement of all banks in our sample to be listed
at the stock exchange. However, the size of banks differs significantly across
the sample. For example, Nordea bank is more than 160 times larger than
the smallest bank in the sample. The sample banks have quite a large market
share in all markets. It varies from almost 40 percent in Finland to almost 79
percent in Sweden (see Table 4.2).
Our dependent variable is the number of banks experiencing shocks on the
same day. In order to obtain it, we calculate daily distance–to–default values
for each bank in our sample (see Subchapter 4.3 for a detailed calculation).
We follow the methodology suggested by Bae et al. (2003) and Gropp et al.
1There are no publicly listed Icelandic banks, so we could not include it in our research.
2This especially applies to the very small banks that have trading volumes below 1,000
shares in more than thirty percent of trading days during the ten years period.
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Table 4.1: List of Sample Banks (Sorted by Total Assets in 2013,
Millions of Euro)
Bank Name Country Code Total Assets
1 Nordea Bank AB SE 630.434
2 Danske Bank A/S DK 432.305
3 DnB ASA NO 284.964
4 Svenska Handelsbanken SE 281.042
5 Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB SE 280.481
6 Swedbank AB SE 205.527
7 Storebrand ASA NO 53.712
8 Pohjola Bank FI 43.720
9 Jyske Bank A/S DK 35.099
10 Sydbank A/S DK 19.812
11 Sparebanken NO 18.722
12 Aktia Bank FI 10.934
13 Spar Nord DK 9.994
14 Avanza Bank AB SE 6.393
15 Alm. Brand A/S DK 5.301
16 Bank of Aland FI 3.887
Source: author’s computations.
(2007) for arbitrarily defining large shocks. They define as large shocks those
observations that are falling in the negative 95th percentile of the common
distribution of the percentage change in DD (ddit/ddit−1). However, for each
bank we chose cut–off point from the bank–specific distribution (ddt/ddt−1)
since we assume that the stochastic processes controlling the distance to default
at different banks are different. Selecting the negative 95th percentile allows
us to have a sufficiently large sample size for the estimation as well as to meet
the need for “large” shocks in the spirit of extreme–value theory (Straetmans
2000). Finally, we count how many banks in a given country are in the negative
tail and following Bae et al. (2003), we call it “coexceedances”. Our dependent
variable is a count variable and its values vary from 0 to 53.
Gropp & Moerman (2004) use the contingency of large shocks to banks’
distance to default to analyze systematically influential banks. They use Monte
Carlo simulations to prove that data tails do not correspond to standard distri-
3It depends on the number of banks in the sample.
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Denmark 12,535 5 71.5 2,507 5
Sweden 12,535 5 78.9 2,507 5
Norway 7,521 3 49.0 2,507 3
Finland 7,521 3 38.6 2,507 2
Total 40,112 16 - - 15
Note: Total market share of the sample banks on the deposit market, although the
market shares vary in different niche markets.
Source: author’s computations.
butional assumptions (multivariate normal, Student t) and, therefore, no com-
mon patterns can be drawn. This suggests that the distribution of distance to
default of separate banks exhibits heavy tails and the correlation among banks’
distances to default is significantly higher for larger shocks. Bae et al. (2003)
apply the same methodology for emerging–market stock returns. Both studies
manifest the need for examining the tails of the distribution of returns or the
distance to default separately from the common distribution.
Table 4.3: Coexceedances by Countries
Denmark Sweden Norway Finland
Coexceedances = 0 1,981 2,136 2,184 2,165
Coexceedances = 1 417 245 272 326
Coexceedances = 2 74 61 51 16
Coexceedances ≥ 3 65 31 - -
Total 2,507 2,507 2,507 2,507
Source: author’s computations.
We are examining how contagious are the banking sectors in the Nordic
countries. However, we cannot reject the alternative of contagion non-existence
and the fact that common shocks are due to the interdependence between
markets since they are closely related with financial linkages. Therefore, to
be able to distinguish between the contagion and interdependence, we include
common factors to control for common shocks. Choosing the independent
variables we rely on the existing literature of financial recessions and contagion
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(Forbes & Rigobon 2002). In total, we employ four independent variables as
control factors. First of all, we take into account the systemic risk possibly
affecting banking sectors. It measures how many stock markets experience
shocks at the same time. In order to construct this variable, we use four stock
market indexes. We include euro area stock market index EURO STOXX 50,
VIX market index to measure U.S. market volatility, MSCI Emerging Markets
Index for emerging markets volatility and finally domestic stock market indexes.
For domestic markets we chose OMXC20, OMXS30, OBX and OMXH25 for
Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland accordingly. Defining large shocks we
used the same methodology as for banks. We calculate daily returns and then
define the bottom 95th percentile. All observations falling in this distribution
we define as shocks and set equal to 1. Systemic risk is then the sum of these for
market indexes, and it varies from 0 to 4. It measures how many markets are
experiencing large shocks at time t. We believe that the systemic risk should
be positively correlated to the number of banks experiencing shocks.
Our second independent variable is yield curve in the domestic country, and
it measures the impact of interest rate shocks on number of coexceedances. We
calculate the difference between ten year government bond and interbank rate
for three months yield and then first–difference it. Yield curve slope is com-
monly used measure in monetary policy helping to measure economic growth.
According to changes in these rates, banks modify their balance sheets – trans-
form long–term assets into short term and vice versa. If the yield curve flattens,
the banks have to pay more for deposits they are holding without receiving
higher yields for long term loans. Therefore, we believe yield curve variable to
be positively correlated to the number of coexceedances. The third indepen-
dent variable is the volatility of the domestic market. Bae et al. (2003) find
that conditional stock return volatility is particularly important in explaining
contagion to emerging markets. For estimating stock market volatility, we use
GARCH (1,1) model of the following form using maximum likelihood.





σ2tc represents the conditional stock market volatility in country c at time t, and
ε represents stock market returns in the corresponding country. The estimated
coefficients are presented in Table 4.4. Our obtained values vary between 0.08
and 0.13 for β1 and between 0.78 and 0.92 for β2.
We are interested in contagion across Nordic countries. However, we cannot
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reject the possibility of volatility spillovers from outside. In order to control for
this, we include conditional volatility of U.S. market that was estimated using
GARCH (1,1)4. We tried to estimate the models with conditional volatility of
the euro area and emerging markets. However, correlation between EURO
STOXX 50 and domestic stock market indices and U.S. stock market and
emerging market indices are above 0.5. Therefore, we chose just U.S. mar-
ket volatility. The stock markets open one day later in U.S. than Europe so
the conditional volatility is lagged by one day.
Table 4.4: Estimated Coefficients of the GARCH (1,1) Model for
Daily Stock Market Returns in the Analyzed Countries
Coefficient St. Error Z - Stat Probability
OMXC20
Constant 0.00 0.00 6.68 0.00
ε2t−1 0.10 0.01 10.66 0.00
σ2t−1 0.88 0.01 79.02 0.00
OMXS30
Constant 0.00 0.00 4.66 0.00
ε2t−1 0.08 0.01 10.64 0.00
σ2t−1 0.91 0.01 108.86 0.00
OBX
Constant 0.00 0.00 4.14 0.00
ε2t−1 0.12 0.01 9.71 0.00
σ2t−1 0.87 0.01 67.79 0.00
OMXH25
Constant 0.00 0.00 4.17 0.00
ε2t−1 0.08 0.01 10.28 0.00
σ2t−1 0.92 0.01 114.70 0.00
VIX
Constant 0.00 0.00 9.80 0.00
ε2t−1 0.13 0.01 11.44 0.00
σ2t−1 0.78 0.02 45.75 0.00
Note: Equation and variable definitions are given in the text.
Source: author’s computations.
Furthermore, in order to control for serial autocorrelation we include lagged
dependent variable of our model as we suspect that first–differencing did not
remove it completely.
Finally, to test for contagion from other markets, we include coexceedances
4Domestic volatility, and U.S. volatility was rescaled by multiplying the estimated values
by 1,000.
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from other countries to our model. Gropp et al. (2007) used number of lagged
coexceedances. We, on the other hand, believe in efficient market hypothesis.
Knowing that Nordic markets are very much interconnected, we assume that
shocks in one country do not take one day to spread to other markets and that
reaction of other markets is instant and, therefore, we chose not to use lagged
values. However, if the markets are not as efficient as we originally assumed,
we will miss some cases of contagion.
Table 4.5 presents summary of all variables used in our model. We can see
that, on average banks in our sample are four standard deviations away from
the default point (mean distance to default of 3.924). SEB bank is the most
volatile bank in terms of stock prices and, therefore, distance to default, and
is the only bank that experienced negative distance to default. The largest
distance to default in our sample is almost twenty standard deviations away
from the default point. The largest negative percentage change in distance to
default is 75 percent. The negative cut–off point differs for each bank and varies
from -3 to -1 percent. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 present more descriptive statistics on
the number of banks and number of coexceedances per country. The number
of banks per country differs somewhat: in Denmark and Sweden there are
five banks in the sample while in Norway and Finland there are only three.
Table 4.5 also indicates that there was at least one day in which all or almost
all banks underwent large negative shocks simultaneously.
Table 4.3 shows that in Denmark there were 34 days with three or more
coexceedances, in Sweden there were 63 such days, while in Norway there were
50 and in Finland 19 days with 2 coexceedances. However, we have to stress
out that the number of coexceedances highly depends on the number of banks
included in the sample and, therefore, does not necessarily imply that one
banking sector is stronger or weaker than the other one. Nevertheless, we can
compare countries with the same number of banks in the sample. We can see
that Danish banks tend to experience fewer shocks compared to Swedish banks
and that banks in Norway tend to be subject to larger shocks more frequently
compared with Finnish banks. Of the total of sixteen banks in the sample, a
maximum of twelve are simultaneously in the tail (on May 22, 2006; on October
7, 2008; on October 27, 2008).
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4.3 Distance–to–Default
The distance to default is represented as the difference between the present
market value of assets of the bank and its predicted default point, divided by the
volatility of assets (KMV Corporation 2002). The value of equity can be seen as
a call option on the assets of the bank. The bank is said to be at default point
when its value of assets is equal to the value of debt. The value and volatility
of assets can be computed using Black–Scholes model by inserting observed
market value and volatility of assets and book value of debt and solving for
two unknowns. Whenever the value of assets increase and/or volatility of assets
decreases, the distance to default increases meaning that the bank is receding
from the default point and the probability of bankruptcy declines. Gropp
et al. (2007) contend that the distance to default is particularly applicable for
predicting and measuring default risk for banks. Particularly, its capability
to measure default risk adequately is not impacted by the possible incentives
of the stockholders to prefer higher risk taking (contrary to unadjusted equity
returns) or by the existence of explicit and implicit financial safety net (contrary
to subordinated debt spreads). Furthermore, distance to default incorporates
the information about stock returns with market leverage and asset volatility
that are the main determinants of the default risk.
Distance to default is derived by starting with the Black–Scholes model.
It is assumed that the market value of the bank’s underlying assets follows a
stochastic process:









which calculates the asset value at time T, given its current value V. ε is the
random error of the firm’s return on assets, which the Black–Scholes model
assumes to be normally distributed, with zero mean and unit variance, N(0,1).
Hence, the current distance d from the default point (where lnV =lnD) can be
written as
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is expressed as the number of asset–value standard deviations (σ) that the bank
is from the default point. Having observable market value (VE) and volatility
σE of equity and book value of debt D as inputs, we can use system of non–
linear equations below, in order to solve for value and volatility of assets V and
σ. 

























Figure 4.1 below graphically represents what defines distance to default and
how it can be used to determine the default probability of a bank. There
are six variables that are important determining the probability of default.
Level of the default point, market value and volatility of asset and expected
distribution of future asset value are the most critical ones. Length of the
horizon depends on the study scope and the expected growth in the asset value
does not have significant default predicting power. As mentioned above, if
the value of the bank’s assets declines below the default point, then the bank
defaults on its liabilities. Therefore, the probability of default can also be seen
as the probability of bank’s assets declining below than the default point. It
is called Expected Default Frequency – EDF – and is the grey area under the
default point. Figure 4.1 also represents the causative relation and trade–off
between the variables. It provides a powerful framework for researchers who
need to analyze what–if questions and manipulate various inputs and examine
possible outcomes. They can examine effects of potential capital restructurings,
examine repercussions of significant stock changes or study the possible options
of growth (such as acquisitions and mergers).
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Figure 4.1: Distance–to–Default, Crosby & Bohn (2003)
4.3.1 Parameters Estimation
In order to calculate the parameters for Distance–to–Default Model, we use
both Excel and R Studio. We implement the underlying parameters to solve
the system of nonlinear equations (4.5) and to find the value and volatility of
the firm’s assets needed to calculate the DD measure.
• The volatility of the equity (σE)
The equity volatility, σE, is calculated as the standard deviation of absolute
daily equity returns. As suggested in Marcus & Shaked (1984), we take six–
month moving average to smooth the volatility. They argue that market partic-
ipants use more smooth volatility instead of using short–term volatile estimates.
• The market value of the equity (VE)
In order to calculate daily values of market capitalization, we used number of
outstanding shares and daily closing stock prices. However, number of out-
standing shares is only available on a quarterly basis on published accounts.
Therefore, we employed cubic spline interpolation to obtain daily values of out-
standing shares, as proposed in Gropp et al. (2007). We chose to interpolate
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only the number of outstanding shares instead of values of market capitaliza-
tion itself. The reason for this is that we did not observe frequent or dramatic
changes in the outstanding number of shares and, therefore, we can conclude
that major volatility in market capitalization values is due to volatile stock
prices. Interpolating only number of shares and then multiplying by accurate
closing stock prices, we have a lower chance of estimation error.
• Risk–free interest rate (r)
We used ten–year government bond rates as risk–free interest.
• Time (T)
T represent time to maturity of the debt. Since it is complicated to obtain
the particular information about the maturity structure of firm’s liabilities, we
chose to set it to one year, which is a commonly used benchmark assumption.
• Liability of the firm (D)
Debt values are available only on a quarterly basis from published accounts
so in order to obtain daily values we chose to use spline interpolation again.
From KMV model, firm’s default point is equal to the short–term plus half of
long–term liabilities.
• The value and volatility of the firm’s asset (V, σ)
Having all other parameters estimated, we can finally apply the system of non–
linear equations and solve for value and volatility of firm’s assets. The two
non–linear simultaneous equations are complicated. We use R Studio to solve
the solutions of the system. The basic steps of the calculation are listed step
by step below.
1. The initial volatility of the firm’s asset is replaced by the volatility of the
equity. Substituting this new value in the first function in equation (4.5),
we derive the corresponding value of the firm’s asset.
2. Substituting the value of the firm’s asset calculated in step 1 into the
second function in equation (4.5) to get the corresponding volatility of
the equity.
3. If the volatility of the equity calculated in step 2 is equal to the real
volatility of the equity, the program stops. Otherwise, we need to readjust
the volatility of the firm’s asset, and repeat the step 1 and 2 till we obtain
the condition in step 3.
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4.4 Econometric Model
As defined above, our dependent variable is the number of banks experi-
encing shocks on the same day – coexceedances. It is a count variable and
varies from 0 to 5. There is a number of approaches dealing with count vari-
able as the dependent variable, such as Poisson regressions, negative binomial
regressions, and most prevalent – ordered and multinomial logit regressions.
The choice of a suitable method depends on the underlying assumptions of
each method. For instance, a tobit model assumes the dependent variable to
be truncated normal. Gropp & Moerman (2004) rejected this assumption in
this type of data. Further, unlike the normal distribution which has a sepa-
rate parameter for the mean and variance, the Poisson distribution variance
is equal to mean. However, this assumption is clearly rejected in our data.
The negative binomial model does not rely on the assumption of conditional
mean and variance equality. Nevertheless, it assumes the dependent variable to
be from the exponential family, which includes the Poisson binomial, gamma,
normal and numerous other distributions. Again, given the arguments of Bae
et al. (2003) and Gropp & Moerman (2004), we do not think this is a suitable
model for our data. Finally, we are left with ordered logit and multinomial logit
methods models as possible estimation methods. The main difference between
these two methods is that the ordered logit model constricts coefficients as well
as marginal effects of independent variables to be the same at each outcome,
while using multinomial logit model we obtain different parameters for each
outcome.
We are interested in different parameters at different outcomes, therefore, as
our primary model we chose to employ multinomial logistic regression. How-
ever, we will present results of ordered logistic regression in our robustness
check section. Below we present our main model, where on the left side is our
dependent variable (the number of coexceedances) and on the right side – our
independent variables controlling for common shocks and measuring the effects
of contagion from other markets.





















j = 1, 2, 3...J stands for the number of coexceedances in country c, Fc repre-
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sents the common shocks in country c, Cct−1 represents the lagged number of
coexceedances in country c, and Cdt represents the coexceedances in period t
in country d. Since we control for common shocks, the significant coefficients of
Cdt would signal cross–border contagion. For simplicity of interpretations and
presentation we limit the outcomes to 0, 1, 2 and 3 or more coexceedances, as
suggested by Bae et al. (2003).
In order to remove the indeterminacy associated with the model, we follow
the convention and define Y = 0 (zero coexceedances) as the base category.
All coefficients are estimated relatively to this base. Still, the interpretation of
results from multinomial logit model are not as straightforward as other more
conventional regressions, such as OLS, and can be intricate. Therefore, it is
useful also to report the marginal effect for the purpose of interpretation. The
marginal effects are obtained from the probability for each outcome j:






















Differentiating with respect to Cd,t yields
∂Prc [Y = j]
∂Cd,t








which can be computed from the parameter estimates, with the independent
variables evaluated at suitable values, along its standard errors. In all tables
we will report the estimated coefficients alongside the marginal probabilities




We dedicate the following chapter for results analysis and interpretations.
We ran three separate regressions: base model, contagion model and extended
contagion model which analyses the impact of financial recession. We start
with the analysis of the base model that does not include contagious effects
from other Nordic markets. We present the output of the regression in Ta-
ble 5.1. Recall that our response variable is the number of banks experiencing
large shocks on the same day in a given country – coexceedances. Here we
are interested what common and systemic factors are influential in explain-
ing simultaneous shocks in the banking sector. Overall, we are able to explain
between three (Finland) and eleven (Sweden and Denmark) percent of the vari-
ation in our dependent variable using only common and systemic risk factors
as the explanatory variables.
We start by analyzing the most significant variables. As expected, con-
ditional domestic volatility appears to be significant in all four markets at at
least 5 percent level. The interpretation of multinomial logit model result is not
as straightforward as traditional linear models, such as ordinary least squares
model. For the purpose of magnitude analysis, we report marginal probabilities
alongside the coefficients. We can observe that in case of Denmark, conditional
volatility is critical in explaining large shocks when three or more banks are
facing difficulties. We can conclude that one percent increase in conditional
volatility increases the chance of three or more coexceedances by 0.013 percent
all other variables held constant. However, conditional volatility seems to be
irrelevant in describing small shocks in Danish banking sector. In the case of
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Sweden, we see slightly different results. Conditional volatility seems to be
an important factor for causing small shocks, as well as the large ones. We
observe that one percent increase in conditional volatility increases the proba-
bility of one exceedance by 0.072 percent, and the probability of large shocks,
when three or more banks are affected, by 0.015 percent everything else kept
constant. In Finnish and Norwegian banking sectors we observe almost iden-
tical results. Conditional volatility appears to be significant for small as well
as for larger shocks. However, we observe slightly less influential effects. We
conclude that one percent increase in conditional volatility would increase the
probability of two coexceedances by 0.008 and 0.013 percent for Norway and
Finland, accordingly. Our results are in line with Bae et al. (2003) research
who claim that conditional volatility is critical in explaining financial conta-
gion. High significance of conditional volatility can also be explained by the
fact that banks in some countries (e.g., Denmark and Sweden) have a signifi-
cant weight in domestic stock market indices so it catches the effects that are
related to contagion.
We further analyze the importance of global systemic risk on Nordic banking
systems. Our results suggest that similar to conditional volatility systemic
risk is crucial in explaining disturbances in Nordic banks. It is significant at
one percent level for all four markets. In the case of Denmark, Norway and
Finland the importance of global systemic risk factor decreases for larger shocks
suggesting that these markets observe some negative spillover effects. However,
systemic risk has weaker associations with large shocks in these countries. We
support such result with the fact that banking activities in Nordic countries are
intra–regional. Nonetheless, we see opposite results in Swedish banking sector.
For larger shocks, systemic risk factor appears to be more significant. We
justify this result with the fact that Sweden is considered to be financial center
among Nordic countries. Naturally it has more foreign activities outside the
region, therefore, the probability and impact of spillovers from other economies
increases. Bengtsson et al. (2013) find evidence that importance of systemic
risk for Swedish banks increased significantly during the recession in 2008–2009
which supports our findings.
Next, we measure the possibility of volatility spillovers from outside the
region by including U.S. market conditional volatility. However, we do not
observe any linkages between U.S. stock market volatility and shocks in the
Nordic banks, except the case of Denmark. Conditional volatility of U.S. stock
market seems to have strong links with shocks in Danish banking sector. For
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example, one percent increase in conditional volatility increases the probability
of three or more coexceedances by 0.013 percent. We believe that increased
impact from US on Danish stock market is a result of the Nordic region be-
coming more connected to the world market as OMX group was acquired by
NASDAQ in 2007. Moreover, Danish banking sector was also more involved
in acquiring sub–prime assets and other toxic instruments on the international
markets.
Our results rejected the assumption that yield curve could be a good predic-
tor for shocks in the banking sector. Economists associate he steepening yield
curve with a fall in stock prices. Investors want to benefit from increasing bond
yield, which is a safer investment opportunity, so they adjust their portfolios
by investing in bonds and withdrawing their investments from stock markets
(Rajan 2005). However, yield curve can no longer be used to accurately predict
future economic development. It also does not accurately foresee how banks
earnings will fluctuate. The conventional view of the banking business is that
banks pay short–term interest on deposits and make loans tied to long–term
interest rates. However, some researches suggest that bank profits become less
responsive to fluctuations in the slope of yield curve. Banks reaction to changes
is interest rates depends on their balance sheet size and the heterogeneity of
their offered products (Hanweck & Ryu 2005). Moreover, analysis confirms
that banks in major advanced countries have learned to insulate from negative
changes in the slope of the yield curve over years (English 2002). As a result,
yield curve no longer has its ability to correctly predict earnings development
and its usefulness as an indicator of the banks soundness and profitability has
contracted.
Finally, we can conclude that there is some autocorrelation in our response
variable and that it was not entirely removed by first–differencing it. Lagged
number of coexceedances is significant for all markets at at least 5 percent level.
All in all, our results match our prior assumptions and expectations.
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5.2 Contagion Model
Next, we continue with the contagion model, where we include a number
of coexceedances from other Nordic countries as variables measuring contagion
to the base specification. In the base model, we controlled only for common
and systemic shocks. We believe that if coefficients of contagion variables turn
out to be positive and significant, we can conclude the existence of contagion
across Nordic banking sectors. We report the results in Table 5.2. At the end of
each output we report the tests measuring the joint significance of each variable
(denoted as, e.g., Σ Contagion DK). We find strong evidence that cross–border
contagion is present and statistically significant in all four Nordic markets. As a
result, we see an increase in pseudo–R2 for each country meaning that new vari-
ables measuring contagion added information to our specification. Denmark is
exposed to contagion risk from Norway and Sweden. Adverse shocks coming
from Norway seem to contribute to large shocks causing deterioration in three
or more Danish banks simultaneously while it does not appear to affect banks
individually. We do not find any exposure to Finish banking sector either for
small or large shocks. On the other hand, Sweden seems to be the most crucial
for Danish banking sector and responsible for all types of shocks. Norway’s
highest exposure is to Swedish banking sector as well. We see some links to
Danish banks, but they are rather minor. Denmark is partly responsible for
both small and large effects adversely influencing Norwegian banking sector.
We also spot some minor impact coming from Finish banking sector affecting in-
dividual banks. Adding contagion effects from other Nordic countries increased
pseudo–R2 only by 2 percent allowing us to assume that Danish banking sector
has some exposure to other parts of the world. This assumption is supported
by our previous findings that Denmark is the only Nordic country experiencing
spillover effects from U.S. market. We conclude that Finnish banking sector is
only exposed to Swedish banks. We do not observe any other influences from
other markets. However, adding foreign coexceedances increased pseudo–R2
by 4 percent which manifests the intensity of exposure. Meanwhile, Sweden,
that is considered to be the Nordic financial center, not only transmits shocks
to other markets, but also exposes its banking sector to all regional markets.
Increase in pseudo–R2 increasing by 6 percent reflects the high exposure to
other markets. Figure 5.1 summarizes the directions of contagion. We present
joint significance test results in Figure 5.2. The arrows depict contagion effect
from one country to another. Solid arrows represent significance of contagion
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at 1 percent significance level and dashed arrows at 5 percent level.
Figure 5.1: Contagion Directions
Note: Solid arrows indicate significance of contagion at the 99 percent
significance level and dashed arrows at the 95 percent level.
Source: author’s composition.
Distance–to–default incorporates the information about stock returns with
market leverage and asset volatility that are the main determinants of default
risk. The higher the distance to default, the lower the probability of default
of the bank and vice versa. The advantage of using this approach is that one
does not need to specify a particular channel of contagion, such as cross–border
lending. Rather, it reflects interdependencies between banking sectors combin-
ing all possible channels of transmission. Nonetheless, based on our results, we
believe some contagion channels are more presumable than others.
First, we can reject the possibility of “domino effects” influencing our results.
We did not include any banks that defaulted on its liabilities during our ana-
lyzed period (Upper & Worms 2004).
Finland has bilateral contagion links only with Sweden. It seems isolated
from other three Nordic countries. First of all, the largest bank in Finland is
Swedish Nordea, which can explain some part of the large exposure to Swedish
banking sector. We can explain the isolation from the rest of the Nordic region
in two ways. First of all, Finland is the only Nordic country where official
currency is euro. Therefore, we can assume that it is more exposed to Euro-
zone members than Nordic countries. It is possible that the euro market with
centralized monetary policy and the single currency enhances the cross–border
interbank links among banks and, therefore, increases cross–border contagion
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risk (Gropp et al. 2007). Another possible explanation is heterogeneity across
sample banks. We have three banks representing Finnish banking sector. How-
ever, they are rather small in size compared to other banks in the sample. Po-
hjola bank is Finnish largest domestic bank, however, it has no foreign activities
in other Nordic countries whatsoever, and that is not consistent with the rest
of the region. All largest national banks have substantial market shares in
other Nordic countries as well. Nonetheless, Pohjola bank and Finnish bank-
ing sector are relatively small compared to the rest of the region which lets
us conclude that this might be another reason for low cross–border contagion
linkages. Overall, large banks are considered to be more important in cross–
border contagion. That is due to the fact, that international interbank lending
among major banks (“money–center banks”) may be important. Small domes-
tic banks commonly are not very active across borders in the tiered interbank
market structure, in which only large banks have dominant roles (Degryse &
Nguyen 2007; Freixas & Holthausen 2005).
Sweden, on the contrary, is exposed to all Nordic countries in terms of cross–
border contagion risk. Swedish banking sector is the largest among all Nordic
countries, and this is represented by Swedish banks in our sample. Largest
Swedish bank Nordea has substantial market shares across all Nordic coun-
tries. However, its particularly high exposure to Denmark, who still attempts
to recuperate from a burst in the housing market since the global financial
recession, and Finland, with drowning high–tech Nokia corporation, is unset-
tling. The result of mutual contagion linkages is consistent with Freixas et al.
(2000), who prove that a tiered structure with money–center banks is sensitive
to contagion risk.
Similarly to Sweden, Denmark and Norway has high exposures to each other
and Sweden, however, not to Sweden. Our sample includes 16 largest banks
from all 4 countries, but Finnish banks are significantly smaller than the rest of
the sample. ThisSuch results lead us to the conclusion that central contagion
channels are related to large banks and above mentioned “money–center banks”
and “tired structure” theories. Therefore, our results also support the view of
contagion caused by asset sales by one financial intermediary, causing a decrease
of stock prices and higher counterparty risks as emphasized in Cifuentes et al.
(2005). Similarly, Allen & Gale (2000) associate banking sector resistance to
shocks with its underlying structure. They find that complete bank networks
are more resistant to shocks while incomplete networks are weaker and less
resistant to outside adverse shocks since banks with fewer counterparties have
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difficulty dispelling the shock. However, our results propose quite different
picture. Sweden with its strong banking sector appears to be less resilient
to shocks from other countries in the region. On the other hand, Finland
with smaller banks and less developed banking sector suffers only from shocks
from Sweden and is resistant to adverse shocks coming from other two Nordic
countries. Minoiu & Reyes (2011) suggest that contagion could be transmitted
through cross–border lending. Sweden and Denmark are considered to be a
part of the “core” of the global banking network, while Norway and Finland
are seen as “periphery”. Moreover, they identify significant connections inside
Nordic region between Denmark, Sweden and Norway. Finland, on the other
hand, is only connected to Swedish banking sector, which supports our findings.
Moreover, they prove that a large part of exposure to Nordic countries and
especially to Sweden comes from Eastern countries, especially Baltic countries.
That is because large share of Baltic banking sector belongs to Nordic banks.
Finally, our results could also be an evidence of the problem of asymmetric
information. Equity holders seeing deteriorating situation in one bank may
take it as a sign of potential problems in other banks. This problem becomes
especially relevant if the financial information is unavailable or uninformative
(Morgan 2002) or stale (Gropp & Kadareja 2007). Herding behavior of investors
results in “bank runs” (Freixas et al. 2000).
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5.3 Contagion Model Extension: The Effect of
the Crisis
The effect of the recent financial crisis on cross–border contagion risk across
Nordic countries is quite vague. One could argue that the 2007 financial crisis
may result in an increase of cross–border contagion risk, since the cross–country
correlations increase during crisis (Forbes & Rigobon 2002). On the other hand,
(Allen & Gale 2000) argue that the right allocation of interbank assets and
liabilities across a number of banks should absorb the contagion risk. In order to
check if our results from the base model are not entirely driven by coexceedances
during the volatile episodes, we split our sample into two subsamples of tranquil
and volatile periods. We base our decision on volatile periods definition on
domestic stock market volatility combined with key dates of the financial crisis
(see Figure 5.2).
• September, 2008 – June, 2009 (Collapse of Lehman Brothers – Launch of
covered bond programme by ECB)
• May, 2010 – June, 2010 (Financial support for Greece – End of covered
bond programme by ECB)
• July, 2011 – December, 2011 (ECB raises interest rates by 25 basis points
– ECB lowers interest rates by 25 basis points)
After dividing our sample into two subsamples of tranquil and volatile times,
we have 2,177 and 328 observations in each, accordingly. In order to analyze
the effect of cross–border contagion on the Nordic markets, we estimate the
model separately for the tranquil and volatile periods. We present the results
in Tables 5.3 and 5.4.
Surprisingly, the results for the tranquil and crisis periods are similar. We
observe slight changes in the significance levels as well as in marginal effects. We
can conclude that contagion did not change its directions across Nordic coun-
tries during the crisis, and that is in line with the results of (Gropp et al. 2007)
who did not observe any stronger links during the crises and, in fact, claimed
that contagion links seemed to weaken after exclusion of volatile episodes. Most
importantly, we do not observe any increased number of cross–border linkages
across the region during the crisis period. As proposed by Forbes & Rigobon
(2002), contagion appears because of increased correlation across markets. We
do not reject this view.
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However, we believe that investor’s behavior could have contributed to con-
tagion linkages during the crisis. Before the crisis hit Europe, the Nordic region
was seen as financially stable and promising investment opportunity. Investor’s
did not differentiate across the markets, nor did they check macroeconomic fun-
damentals thoroughly. It is possible that during a recession they became more
careful and more considerate towards their investments and did not see Nordic
region as a single market.
Figure 5.3: Contagion Directions for Tranquil Periods
Note: Solid arrows indicate significance of contagion at the 99 percent
significance level and dashed arrows at the 95 percent level.
Source: author’s composition.
We present joint significance tests of contagion variables at the bottom of
Tables 5.3 and 5.4. We conclude that the effect of the recent financial crisis
has ambiguous effects on the cross–sectoral banking contagion.
First of all, we should also examine marginal effects for single outcomes
and see if there were some changes between tranquil and volatile periods as
well. We start with an analysis of Danish banking sector. Before the crisis,
Sweden contagion variable was influential for smaller and medium shocks in
Danish banking sector (one exceedance and two coexceedances). During the
crisis, this effect seems to evaporate as coefficients and marginal probabilities
become insignificant. However, for large shocks (three or more coexceedances),
we see that marginal probabilities increased from 0.004 to 0.032 manifesting
the intensification of adverse shocks. On the other hand, before the crisis we
could spot the contagion exposure to Norwegian banks and during the crisis
this link seems to disappear. Eventually, looking to joint significance test we
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Figure 5.4: Contagion Directions for Volatile Periods
Note: Solid arrows indicate significance of contagion at the 99 percent
significance level and dashed arrows at the 95 percent level.
Source: author’s composition.
conclude that contagion risk to Danish banking sector declined during the cri-
sis both from Swedish as well as Norwegian markets. In the case of Sweden,
we see increased gravity of contagion from Norwegian banking sector as a re-
sult of the crisis. On the other hand, our results reveal that contagion from
Finland and Denmark decreased and the markets separated somewhat. These
results are based on joint significance test. However, if we look to marginal
probabilities for large shocks (three and more coexceedances), we can conclude
that contagion risk from other Nordic countries increased significantly for large
shocks. Marginal probability of Danish contagion variable increased from 0.008
to 0.054, Finnish from 0.013 to 0.086, and Norway contagion variable changed
from insignificant to significant implying new contagion exposure during the
crisis. In the case of Norway and Finland, we find similar results. We conclude
that Norway and Denmark as well as Norway and Sweden became more depen-
dent on each other during the crisis. However, we find evidence that Swedish
banking sector became less influential during the financial stress.
The results are, therefore, equivocal. On one hand there are country pairs
which experienced a strengthening of the contagion during the crisis (Sweden
and Norway), while on the other hand some pairs experienced a weakening
(Sweden and Denmark, Sweden and Finland). Two messages stand out in the
context. First, the relationship between banking sectors is rather complex - and
a crisis occurring in some third country does not necessarily have to activate
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the contagion process, or at least not for all country pairs, while it can affect
other pairs (see (Reinhart & Calvo 1996; Frankel & Schmukler 1996; Corsetti
et al. 2005; De Gregorio & Valdes 2001)). Second, there seems to be a core
banking system in the Nordic region - the Swedish banking system. This latter
result, as well as the general message related to the crisis period, is also sup-
ported by the findings in Minoiu & Reyes (2011). They analyze global banking
network focusing on cross–border flows of financial capital. They find evidence
that connectivity tends to weaken during the global financial crises (see Fig-
ure 5.5). In their analysis, they divide economies into “core” and “periphery”
which stand for advanced, and emerging and developing markets, accordingly.
“Core” economies are the dominant players in the global banking network and
act as lenders, while “periphery” markets act as borrowers who receive liquid-
ity. They find evidence that links between “intra-core” and “core-periphery”
sharply reduced during the crisis as cross–border flows dried up (Hoggarth et al.
2010; Milesi-Ferretti & Tille 2011). Similarly, Cetorelli & Goldberg (2012) ar-
gue that cross–border lending was key transmission channel of global financial
crisis to emerging economies. Domestic loan supply in impaired economies
shrank due to collapse of direct cross–border lending by foreign banks and
domestic banks caused by shortage of interbank and cross–border lending.
Figure 5.5: Global Banking Network, Minoiu & Reyes (2011)
Note: Arrows between countries represent cross–border bank loans. Thicker and darker
arrows represent larger flows. When bilateral flows occur, the connecting arrows split into
two, each half–aarow representing the magnitude of one flow.
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5.4 Robustness Check
In order to check for robustness of the results, we estimate alternative mod-
els. It is important to check if our results are not spurious to be able to draw
reliable conclusions. Hence, we apply the following robustness checks to prove
the validity of our results: redefining threshold for defining adverse shocks,
adding conditional volatilities of countries with significant contagion effects,
reestimating model using ordered logit regression. Instead of reporting re-
sults for each specification, we summarized the robustness checks in convenient
matrix tables1. The summarized results of contagion model estimated using
multinomial logit model are presented in Table 5.5.
Table 5.5: Results of the Basic Contagion Model
To ↓ From → Denmark Sweden Norway Finland
Denmark X *** *** -
Sweden *** X *** ***
Norway ** *** X -
Finland - *** - X
Source: author’s composition.
In the previous section, we divided our data sample into tranquil, and
volatile periods in order to measure the contagion effects during the crisis and
during tranquil periods. At the same time we were able to prove that our results
are not driven or distorted by crisis since they were not significantly different
from our central contagion model, which was our first robustness check.
Table 5.6: Results of the Basic Contagion Model for the Tranquil Pe-
riods
To ↓ From → Denmark Sweden Norway Finland
Denmark X *** * -
Sweden *** X ** ***
Norway * *** X -
Finland - *** - X
Source: author’s composition.
1Full regression outputs are available from the author upon request.
5. Estimation Results 72
Table 5.7: Results of the Basic Contagion Model for the Volatile Pe-
riods
To ↓ From → Denmark Sweden Norway Finland
Denmark X *** - -
Sweden *** X *** ***
Norway ** *** X -
Finland - *** - X
Source: author’s composition.
Next, we changed our threshold for defining adverse shocks. In the basic
specification, we used bank–specific distribution because we wanted to have the
same number of shocks for each bank. However, now we put an assumption
that stochastic processes controlling the distance to default at different banks
are identical and use a common distribution to define adverse shocks. Our
results suggest that stochastic processes are, in fact, the same for all the banks
in our sample since the results do not differentiate from the basic specification.
Table 5.8: Results Using Common Distribution of ddit/|ddit−1|
To ↓ From → Denmark Sweden Norway Finland
Denmark X *** *** -
Sweden *** X *** ***
Norway *** *** X -
Finland - *** - X
Source: author’s composition.
Then, as suggested in Gropp et al. (2007), we suspect that our results are
somewhat influenced by volatility spillovers from other Nordic markets rather
than contagion. Therefore, we reformulate our contagion model by including
conditional volatilities of those markets where we found significant contagion ef-
fects. We report the results of the reestimated model in Table 5.9 and conclude
that they are identical to our contagion model results.
Finally, we reestimated our contagion model using ordered logit regression.
Almost identical contagion direction indicate that estimation method does not
influence our results. We present results of ordered logit model in Table 5.10.
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Table 5.9: Results after Adding the Conditional Volatilities of the
Countries with Significant Contagion Coefficients
To ↓ From → Denmark Sweden Norway Finland
Denmark X *** *** -
Sweden *** X *** ***
Norway *** *** X -
Finland - *** - X
Source: author’s composition.
Table 5.10: Results using an Ordered Logit Model
To ↓ From → Denmark Sweden Norway Finland
Denmark X *** *** -
Sweden *** X *** ***
Norway *** *** X -
Finland - *** - X
Source: author’s composition.
5.5 Postestimation
There are a couple of postestimation tests that are often applied regarding
the multinomial logit model estimation. First, it is common to compute the
joint significance test and check that all of the coefficients of our response vari-
ables are simultaneously equal to zero, i.e., the independent variable does not
influence our dependent variable. We report the results of joint significance
tests in the bottom of our regression output tables. Multinomial logit model is
often considered to be theoretically and empirically superior to the more com-
monly used analysis because it does not have strict assumptions such as nor-
mality, linearity, or homoscedasticity. However, it does assume the collinearity
to be relatively low as it gets more complicated to discern the effects of different
variables is they are highly correlated.
Nevertheless, the multinomial logistic regression has a fundamental assump-
tion of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). It means that different
response variable outcomes must be independent, or a choice of one category is
not related to another category existence or absence. We assess this assumption
using Hausman–McFadden test. We present the results in Table 5.11. Hausman
test for IIA assumption confirms the suitability of our data. We cannot reject
H0 hypothesis and, therefore, confirm that outcomes are independent of each
other. In the case of Norway, we can observe negative Chi-square. However,
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Hausman & McFadden (1984) note this possibility and conclude that negative
result is evidence that IIA has not been violated. The Hausman test of IIA is
defined as:
HIIA = (β̂R − β̂∗F )′[V̂ ar(β̂R)− V̂ ar(β̂∗F )]−1(β̂R − β̂∗F ) (5.1)
Hausman & McFadden (1984) emphasize that HIIA can be negative when (β̂R−
β̂∗F ) is not positive semidefinite and suggest that a negative HIIA is evidence
that IIA holds2.
Table 5.11: Hausman Test for IIA Assumption
H0: Odds (Outcome–J vs. Outcome–K) are
independent of other alternatives
Denmark
Omitted chi2 df p >chi2 evidence
1 14.109 18 0.722 for H0
2 24.516 18 0.139 for H0
3 22.788 18 0.199 for H0
Sweden
Omitted chi2 df p >chi2 evidence
1 17.709 18 0.475 for H0
2 12.785 18 0.804 for H0
3 8.981 18 0.960 for H0
Norway
Omitted chi2 df p >chi2 evidence
1 16.067 9 0.065 for H0
2 -3.095 9 – –
Finland
Omitted chi2 df p >chi2 evidence
1 2.119 9 0.989 for H0
2 5.895 9 0.750 for H0
Note: If chi2 <0, the estimated model does not meet
asymptotic assumptions of the test
Source: author’s computations.
2β̂F – estimates of full model, β̂R – estimates of restricted model, β̂
∗
F – estimates of full
model after eliminating coefficients not estimated in the restricted model.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
The globalization of financial markets during the past few decades has made
it much easier to transmit financial crisis from one economy to another. In
order to suppress or at least be able to forecast the contagion, it is important to
analyze the times of financial distress and focus on the transmission mechanisms
and factors which make a crisis spread across borders.
The main focus of this thesis is the analysis of the contagion in the bank-
ing sectors of four continental Nordic countries over the 2004 – 2014 period.
Using a multinomial logit model we test whether there is any degree of conta-
gion among the four banking sectors, whether it is more pronounced for larger
banks and whether the recent financial crisis has exacerbated it. Moreover, we
also estimate which common and systemic factors contribute to shocks in the
banking sectors in Nordic countries.
We estimated three empirical models to test our hypotheses. First model
analyzed what common factors contribute to shocks in the banking sector. We
find strong evidence that conditional volatility is crucial in explaining distress in
banks. Moreover, we find evidence that Nordics are not an exception and expe-
rience adverse effects from systemic risks arising across the globe. We tested if
spillovers from U.S. market effects Nordic banks, and found evidence that only
Danish banking sector is exposed to such risks. Finally, our assumption that
yield curve could be used to predict and explain shocks in the banking sector
was rejected. Our result contributed to the predominant view that changes in
slope of yield curve can no longer be efficiently used to predict future economic
development or accurately foresee how banks earning will fluctuate.
The second empirical model included contagion effects from other Nordic
countries. Our results strongly confirm the significant existence of cross–border
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contagion among Nordic banking sectors. We find evidence that all four mar-
kets have some exposure to contagion risk coming from the other country in
the Nordic region. However, some countries are more exposed than others. For
example, Sweden has bilateral contagion links with all other Nordic countries,
while Finland is only connected to Sweden. The role of the banking sector in
the global banking network seems to be particularly important here. Sweden,
for instance, is part of the international “core” banking centers - connected well
both within the region as well as with other important international banking
centers. This also reflects on the size of the banks in the system. Finland,
on the contrary is a peripheral or at most just a regional banking hub, with
relatively small banking institutions. That leads us to the conclusion that con-
tagion is more likely to be transmitted through large banks and/or through
internationally important banking centers. In the same vein, we believe that
tiered interbank market structure where large banks play a dominant role is
more exposed to contagion risk.
Last but not least, we estimated the model measuring what effect did cur-
rent financial crisis have on contagion risk in Nordic countries. After careful
analysis of the results, we come to the conclusion that the effect of recent
financial turmoil is equivocal. On one hand, there are country pairs which
experienced a strengthening of contagion during the crisis (Norway and Swe-
den). On the other hand, we find evidence that contagion links between Dan-
ish and Swedish, and Swedish and Finnish markets weakened during volatile
episodes. Moreover, it is interesting to notice that the strength of contagion
risk increased from Danish to Norwegian banking sector but decreased from
Norwegian to Danish. That is in line with the fact, that Denmark and Sweden
are a part of the core global banking network while Norway and Finland are
perceived to be secondary markets. During the financial stress, capital flows
dry up. The secondary markets that are heavily dependent on international
financing become more susceptible to contagion risk.
The discussion on the need for banking sector regulation and supervision
relies crucially on the issue whether there is cross–border contagion risk in
banking, or not. At international level, awareness of the causes and under-
standing of transmission mechanisms of cross–border contagion can help au-
thorities improve international financial regulation system and, thus, make it
more resistant to shocks and contagion risk. At domestic level, improved finan-
cial supervision policies can help improve the economy and restrict exposure
to contagion. Better understanding how contagion spreads within financial in-
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termediaries would be advantageous in making financial reforms, for example,
how to regulate capital ratio to balance between maximizing bank’s revenues
and protecting them from shocks and contagion risk. Once the existence of
contagion risk is confirmed, it is important to perform deeper analysis on the
possible contagion transmission channels. This issue may be subject for the
future research.
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